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ABSTRACT 
This thesis determines the technology and architecture best suited for sharing 
security information among mass transit systems (MTS), their security partners, and 
TSA.  The architecture would enable TSA to enhance the security of MTS and surface 
transportation.  It incorporates existing security practices between MTS, their regional 
security partners, and TSA.  Existing practices were determined through interviews and 
case reviews of regional information sharing networks.  These were analyzed to identify 
gaps in information sharing practices and technology.   Requirements for the architecture 
were established to close the gaps, accounting for the variability in size, capability, risk 
and ownership characteristics of MTS.  A scalable architecture, adaptable to evolving 
homeland security requirements, and capable of exchanging information among disparate 
databases and formats was needed.  Characteristics of Service Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) were analyzed and found to fulfill these requirements.  Technologies underlying 
SOA, including XML and web services, were reviewed to develop the understanding 
needed to create the architecture.  An architecture was created for TSA consistent with its 
organization and business practices, and that of MTS and their stakeholders.  Data 
exchange standards being developed by DHS were incorporated in the architecture.  
Collaboration and governance considerations for implementing SOA were briefly 
discussed.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
As a result of recent terrorist attacks on public transportation overseas, and in 
light of the 9/11 attacks, several federal mandates require improvements in our nation’s 
preparedness to defend against attacks on our nation’s mass transit systems (MTS) and 
passenger rail systems.  The capability to share information across federal, state and local 
boundaries, and the private sector, is fundamental to achieving joint preparedness across 
jurisdictions.   The need to share information in order “to connect the dots” has been 
echoed in almost all strategies for Homeland Security (HS).  Effective and efficient 
information sharing remains an elusive goal however, not only in the transportation 
domain, but in other domains of HS as well.   
Localized information networks and databases, both informal and formal, have 
proliferated across the nation.  Information sharing IT systems of MTS should not remain 
isolated from information sharing systems of local, regional and federal Law 
Enforcement (LE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), fusion centers and that 
of other HS partners.  Yet there is no overarching architecture to connect these disparate 
“islands” of information, using IT, to enable TSA to develop a holistic picture of 
emerging threats to MTS.   HS strategies and programs will continue to evolve across all 
levels of government and the private sector, as the nascent multi-disciplinary field of HS 
matures.  Therefore, TSA must promote a scalable, open-architecture information sharing 
system than can adapt to, and be flexible enough to easily accommodate evolutions in 
HS. 
The thesis proposes an information sharing architecture for exchanging security 
information1 between the TSA and its surface transportation security partners, building 
                                                 
1 Security information is commonly exchanged between TSA, mass transit systems and its law 
enforcement partners.  The information includes observations of suspicious activities with a probable nexus 
to terrorism.  Examples are probable terrorist surveillance of transportation infrastructure, suspicious 
photography, suspicious derailments, theft of employee uniforms, or other observations that could indicate 
probing or testing of security systems, prior to launching an attack.  Security information is commonly 
disseminated among stakeholders, as unstructured reports without a standard format, and are generally 
called Suspicious Activities Reports (SARs).  Security information is discussed in detail throughout the 
thesis.  
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on existing business practices and relationships.  The architecture leverages standards for 
information exchange under development by DHS,2 and worldwide web standards used 
by the private sector and commerce.  (While this thesis addresses information exchange, 
the analysis of information and methods used to do so, whether using manual methods or 
artificial intelligence, are beyond the scope of this thesis.) 
Technology is a key enabler of information sharing, and the strategic concepts of 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) can be effectively harnessed to further DHS’s 
efforts in information sharing. The concept of SOA enables communication between 
autonomous web based services (databases, computer systems, and purpose-specific 
software) each of which is independently managed and implemented.  Communication is 
enabled through the use of commonly accepted, published standards for describing the 
data that is exchanged, and the use of transforms to translate between data formats and 
semantics used by different systems and databases.  Since SOA “loosely couples” 
services, it enables any  computer to communicate with any computer, and allows new 
information sharing partners to join or leave the network, as HS information sharing 
needs evolve.   SOA is ideally suited for connecting geographically and technologically 
disparate sources and systems of information, while retaining and leveraging existing 
systems, minimizing cost and duplication of effort.  SOA automates the information 
sharing process and reduces the effort and potential for human error associated with 
manually composing and sending emails, and making phone calls on a one-to-one basis.   
The application of SOA described here uses domestic mass (public) transit and 
passenger rail systems in the United States as an example, to limit the focus of the thesis.  
However, the strategic principles outlined here are applicable to other sectors, and 
scalable across multiple domains of HS, to develop a larger system linking multiple 
systems and domains.  
 
                                                 
2 Standards such as the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM), Universal Core (UCore), and 
Global Justice Information Sharing Data Model (Global JXDM) are being developed to facilitate automated 
data exchange between Justice, Intelligence, Immigration, Infrastructure, International Trade and other 
domains, for exchanging information for a variety of purposes, including security.. 
 3
A. BENEFITS OF THE ARCHITECTURE 
The author believes that the architecture proposed in the thesis can certainly 
benefit the security of MTS and passenger rail systems in the U.S.  As explained later in 
the thesis, it can also achieve other important benefits summarized below: 
• The lack of effective, efficient and automated information sharing is a 
widespread problem for all HS stakeholders, and a major roadblock for 
achieving effective security.  The architecture in this thesis offers a 
roadmap for solving this problem, not only for MTS, but also advances 
TSA’s mission of enhancing overall transportation security.  Furthermore, 
other domains and communities of HS can also apply SOA, and follow the 
roadmap in this thesis to address their information sharing problems, 
wherever similar “stovepiped” systems exist.   
• The information sharing architecture facilitates the detection of emerging 
threats, and preventing or deterring a terrorist attack, rather than 
responding to it after the fact.  Had the 9/11 attack been prevented through 
effective information sharing, we can only imagine the enormous 
difference it would have made to our society, economy, and the world.   
• DHS has made progress in establishing standards for automated data 
exchange, such as NIEM, UCore and Global JXDM, as mentioned earlier.  
However MTS and the surface transportation sector has not yet 
participated in this DHS-wide, collaborative effort, although MTS has 
been a favorite target for terrorists overseas, and is at risk in the U.S.  This 
thesis provides a roadmap for how TSA should lead MTS in joining this 
collaborative effort.  It shows that much of the work has already been 
accomplished by NIEM stakeholders from the Department of Justice, and 
TSA need only fill in the gaps.  Transportation security cannot be isolated 
from other domains, sectors and communities, because the terrorist crosses 
these boundaries, and does not recognize sectoral differences within DHS.  
This thesis emphasizes the immediate need for TSA to engage and 
describes an approach for doing so, using SOA. 
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• As SOA is incrementally implemented and its benefits become evident, 
increasing numbers of stakeholders will be able to overcome the human 
and systemic reluctance to share information.  The benefits of SOA will 
heighten the responsibility of HS stakeholders to share information, and 
hasten the cultural shift needed for all HS stakeholders to collaborate 
towards a common objective.     
B. AUDIENCE FOR THE THESIS 
The thesis should be of immediate value to the TSA, which was created by the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)3 soon after the terrorist attacks of 
9/11.  DHS designated TSA as the Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for implementing 
ATSA, making TSA the responsible agency for the prevention, protection, and response 
to terrorist attacks against all modes of transportation.  The modes include mass transit 
and passenger rail systems, aviation, freight rail, highway and pipeline.4  Therefore TSA 
should take the lead to implement information sharing technology for surface 
transportation security, consistent with the framework being developed by DHS.   
To limit its scope, the thesis addresses Mass Transit Systems (MTS) only, 
however the concept of information sharing using SOA should be applied to all modes 
within the transportation sector (aviation, highway (cargo trucking, interstate passenger 
buses), freight rail, hazardous materials transportation and pipelines), to provide overall 
awareness of surface transportation security.  
The thesis is intended to achieve the following: 
• Communicate information technology problems, solutions, justifications 
and recommendations to policy makers in HS in non-technical terms.  This 
will illustrate to leadership the incremental process of implementing SOA, 
and the need for funding as a series of strategic investment decisions.   In 
turn, this will help senior leadership implement policies and governance, 
                                                 
3Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), U.S. Code 114, 28 (2001), § 107-171. 
4 The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead agency for maritime security, including passenger ferries. 
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and provide resources needed for information sharing technology to 
enhance surface transportation security. 
• Enable managers and technical representatives of contracting officers in 
government, to better communicate operational needs and requirements to 
Information Technology (IT) contractors.   It will provide government 
managers develop a better understanding of rapidly changing information 
sharing technologies, for developing improved statements of work, and for 
purchasing systems that efficiently exchange information with a variety of 
HS systems, using the concept of SOA. 
• Help security operations personnel better understand, accept and work 
with today’s technologies for information sharing, to make their work 
more effective and efficient.  It should promote stronger engagement 
between the technologists developing software and hardware, and the 
operations community who implement the business processes of the 
transportation security community.  
Since the thesis discusses SOA for information sharing among stakeholders in the 
MTS security community, background on MTS, the growing terrorist threat facing it, and 
TSA’s security initiatives for protecting MTS are discussed below.  
C. BACKGROUND OF THE MASS TRANSIT INDUSTRY  
Mass Transit Systems5 (MTS) in the U.S. carry large numbers of people over 
short distances. It includes commuter passenger rail service (suburban rail), heavy rail 
(metro, subway, or rapid transit), light rail (streetcars, trolleys, trams), transit buses, and 




                                                 
5 For definition of mass transit see U.S. Code Title 49, Subtitle III, Chapter 53 §5302. 
6 While ferries fall under the legal definition of transit, the lead agency for maritime security- the U.S. 
Coast Guard- is responsible for ferry security, rather than TSA. 
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almost  10 billion transit trips per year; they use public transportation vehicles over 34 
million times each weekday.  This is eighteen times the number of daily domestic 
boardings on the nation’s airlines.7 
There are 14 subway systems in the U.S. with 1023 stations, 21 commuter rail 
systems and 27 light rail systems.  Other mass transit agencies operate both trains and 
buses, while most are bus-only systems.  The largest mass transit systems are located in 
the large urban areas of New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Washington D.C., 
Philadelphia and New Jersey, with New York City having the largest system.8  In 
addition, Amtrak (which does not fall under the definition of mass transit and, unlike 
mass transit, operates in interstate commerce), operates a nationwide rail transportation 
network of 22,000 miles of track, and serves 21 million passengers per year at more than 
500 stations. 
Most of the larger MTS are owned and operated by state or local governmental or 
quasi-governmental organizations; however, the smaller transit systems are mostly 
independently owned and operated.   Mass transit agencies serve local areas, do not 
operate in interstate commerce, and do not fall under direct federal jurisdiction.  
Of the 6000 transit agencies in the U.S., about five hundred fifty-six (556) local 
public transit operators provide services in 408 urbanized areas of over 50,000 
population.  An additional 1,215 organizations provide transit services in non-urbanized 
(rural) areas and 3,673 organizations provide specialized services to the elderly and to 
people with disabilities.9  
There is considerable variation among MT agencies regarding their size, 
passenger capacity, operational complexity, and levels of staffing and security personnel.  
                                                 
7 William Millar of American Public Transportation Association (APTA) speaking  before the House 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on March 2007. 
http://www.apta.com/government_affairs/apatest/testimony070307.cfm (accessed September 6, 2008). 
8 American Public Transportation Association, Public Transportation, “Fact Book 2005,” American 
Public Transportation Association, www.apta.com (accessed on September 19, 2008). 
9 Federal Transit Administration, “Public Transit in the United States,” Federal Transit Administration, 
http://www.fta.dot.gov/publications/reports/other_reports/publications_134.html (accessed September 6, 
2008). 
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The terrorist threat and risk varies as well, depending on the geographic location of the 
agency, and potential economic impact and consequences of an attack.  Consequently, 
transit agencies’ information technology (IT) needs, capabilities and sophistication for 
sharing security information vary from agency to agency.  Using a risk informed 
approach, TSA has determined that its security priorities should first focus on the Top 50 
agencies, which carry about 80% of the nations’ mass transit riders.  After addressing the 
Top 50, TSA plans to address smaller agencies ranking between 51-100.  The rankings 
are based on ridership data in the National Transit Database (NTD), which is also used by 
the Federal Transit Administration (FTA).10  This thesis focuses on examining 
information sharing practices among the Top 50 agencies to identify how SOA can be 
used to improve those practices, and extend its benefits to smaller agencies beyond the 
Top 50 in the future.   
The economic importance of public transportation cannot be underestimated.  
Mass Transit is the primary means for commuting to work in crowded urban areas, and 
provides significant direct and indirect benefits to the economy.  The Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) estimates that the annual benefits that transit returns to the national 
economy easily outpace its costs (by $26 billion in 1997).11   During the 1990s, transit 
returned $23 billion per year in affordable mobility for households that prefer not to 
drive, cannot afford a car, or cannot drive due to age or disability, $19.4 billion per year 
in reduced congestion delays for rush-hour passengers and motorists, $10 billion per year 
in reduced auto ownership costs, up to $12 billion per year in reduced auto emissions, $2 
billion savings per year in local human service agency budgets, and a 2 percent boost in 
property tax receipts from commercial real estate.12  Therefore, a terrorist attack on mass 
                                                 
10 NTD is the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) national database of statistics for the transit 
industry. The NTD is comprised of data reported by more than 600 transit agencies across the U.S., which 
is then analyzed and compiled into reports published by FTA and made available to the public on the NTD 
Program website. For more information see National Transit Database 
http://www.ntdprogram.gov/ntdprogram/ntd.htm#overview (accessed September 6, 2008). 
11  Federal Transit Administration, “Public Transit in the United States,” Federal Transit 
Administration, http://www.fta.dot.gov/publications/reports/other_reports/publications_134.html (accessed 
September 6, 2008). 
12 Ibid. 
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transit systems would cause considerable harm to the economy, in addition to the severe 
human and psychological toll it would inflict. 
D. THE GROWING TERRORIST THREAT TO MASS TRANSIT 
The urgent need to enhance security in mass transit became evident when 
terrorists attacked passenger rail systems in Madrid (2004), London (2005) and Mumbai 
(2006).  The ease of access to mass transit and the openness of the systems needed to 
transport large numbers of passengers at rush hour make mass transit a vulnerable target 
for terrorists.  The terrorist capabilities needed to attack transit systems are relatively 
simple as demonstrated by the successful use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to 
inflict large numbers of casualties in overseas attacks.  The attacks in Mumbai, London 
and Madrid caused a combined estimated 400 deaths and 3,000 injuries.   
The increase of home-grown terrorism in the U.K. was demonstrated by the 
bombing of the London Subway (Underground) in 2005, and in the aborted U.K. plot to 
use liquid explosives to blow up planes flying between the U.K. and the U.S.  These 
events raised concerns of similar homegrown terrorism in the U.S. 
The aborted plot in June 200713 to blow up fuel tanks at John F. Kennedy airport 
is but one example of radical elements in the U.S. domestic population, who try to 
identify weaknesses in U.S. transportation and related infrastructure, to plan their attacks.  
These radical elements are often inspired by, or affiliated with, al-Qa’ida.  A successful 
attack against mass transit would satisfy al-Qa’ida’s two main goals for attacks on the 
Homeland:  causing mass casualties and damaging the U.S. economy, in addition to 
causing psychological trauma similar to that of 9/11. 
The threat to Mass Transit systems continues to grow.  Among several recent 
intelligence reports raising awareness of threats to the mass transit industry, is a 19 
January 2008 (U//FOUO)14 Situational Awareness Report from the TSA intranet titled 
Arrests in Spain Point to Potential Threats to Transportation.  On January 19, 2008, 
                                                 
13 WNBC News “JFK Terror Plot Foiled in Planning Stages,” WNBC News, (June 2, 2007), 
http://www.wnbc.com/news/13431721/detail.html?dl=mainclick (accessed September 6, 2008). 
14 Unclassified/ For Official Use Only. (U/FOUO). 
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Spanish authorities arrested 14 suspected Islamic extremists in Barcelona, Spain, who 
allegedly were in the final stage of their preparations to conduct attacks on the Barcelona 
subway system.  Reports of possible terrorist surveillance of U.S. transportation systems, 
coupled with the potential for al-Qa’ida inspired domestic jihadist groups to target U.S. 
MTS, similar to London and Madrid, have raised serious concerns in the U.S.   
Inadequate information sharing for situational awareness can be a major hindrance to 
TSA and MT systems’ ability to protect themselves against terrorist attacks. 
E. TSA’S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INFORMATION SHARING 
A brief history of the mandates, responsibilities and plans for transportation 
security, and information sharing to support transportation security is presented below.  
Before the attack of 9/11, security for mass transit and passenger rail was left to 
individual transit systems around the country, to implement measures as they saw fit, 
with minimal federal oversight or responsibility.  The passage of ATSA in November 
2001 gave TSA the responsibility for ensuring security in all modes of transportation, to 
acknowledge that terrorism was more than a local or regional issue, and required federal 
involvement and responsibility.  However, TSA’s primary focus remained on aviation 
since the threat was perceived to be the highest in aviation - the mode used for the 9/11 
attack.  Since then however, several overseas attacks on mass transit and passenger rail 
have exposed the myriad vulnerabilities of MTS to attack by terrorists.    
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was issued by DHS in 2006.  
Section 4.2 of the NIPP describes the need for a networked approach to information 
sharing to protect the nation’s infrastructure sectors, including transportation.  Appendix 
3.c of the NIPP outlines strategic plans for the collection of information about critical 
infrastructures, owned mainly by the private sector, to establish the National Asset 
Database.15   
In June 2006, TSA issued the Transportation Systems Security Plan (TSSP), 
which includes annexes for each transportation mode, such as mass transit and passenger 
                                                 
15 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington: 
D.C.: Government Printing Office 2006). 
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rail.16 The TSSP contains strategies for the protection of transportation system 
infrastructures but does not detail TSA’s plans for security information sharing.   
TSA’s draft Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan (TSISP) dated 
December 2007, is a strategic plan that “addresses the current state of transportation 
information sharing and the future direction of systems and processes.”17  The proposed 
Implementation Schedule in the draft TSISP indicates that TSA plans to begin 
implementation of information sharing among federal agencies commencing in FY 2008, 
and with state, local and private entities (which includes mass transit systems) starting in 
FY 2010, provided funding is available.  
Therefore, TSA’s initial focus for the next few years is to implement information 
sharing with other DHS agencies.  Only after that would TSA start to develop a 
comprehensive information sharing network to include transit systems, private entities 
and State and local governments.  
F. RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. What architecture should TSA develop to enable information sharing for 
surface transportation security between TSA, MTS and their security partners at local, 
state and regional levels that build on existing relationships, business processes and 
systems?   
1.a. How can the architecture facilitate future expansion of the information 
sharing network, as Homeland Security informational needs and stakeholders grow? 
 
                                                 
16Transportation Security Administration, Transportation Systems Security Plan (internal unpublished 
draft, 2007) 




The methodology for this research was driven by the fact that no literature was 
found that addressed nationwide security information sharing between TSA, MTS and its 
security partners, to detect emerging threats.  Consequently the current state of 
information sharing was obtained through interviews, and reviews of cases of regional 
information sharing, rather than a review of a comprehensive body of existing literature 
on the topic.    
The absence of literature on nationwide security information sharing likely stems 
from the fact that MTS systems are local or regional operations with no interconnection 
among them; hence, there was no need to exchange information.  MTS were not part of 
interstate commerce and their security was not, and is not, federally regulated.  Prior to 
the events of 9/11 and the attacks against overseas rail systems, MTS did not envision a 
need to share security information nationwide.  Before 9/11, an agency similar to TSA 
did not exist to connect security information across the U.S. with a specific focus on 
antiterrorism in MTS.  Consequently the methodology reflects the fact that much of the 
information to describe the “as-is” state of information sharing had to be obtained from 
grassroots interviews, rather than review of a comprehensive body of existing literature.    
The methodology used to develop the information sharing architecture required, 
first, the collection of information on current information sharing practices and the 
technology used to do so, by TSA and MTS.  The information was then analyzed to 
develop Findings (gaps in information sharing).  The Findings formed the basis for 
establishing Functional Requirements for the proposed architecture to fulfill.    
Next, literature describing the technology concepts underlying SOA and its use of 
XML was reviewed to understand the building blocks needed to create a SOA to 
effectively fulfill the functional requirements.18  Government literature describing the 
framework being developed by DHS for information sharing across the entire HS 
                                                 
18 Richard Bergin and Kenji Kato, XML Lab 101, online lecture module, IS 4010, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2007. XML is a computer language used to label, categorize, and organize data or document 
content. 
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enterprise was also reviewed to ensure consistency of the proposed SOA with DHS’ 
framework.  Finally, a SOA architecture is proposed for TSA that is consistent with the 
organizational construct, existing relationships and business processes of TSA and MTS 
systems in the U.S.    
A. INFORMATION COLLECTION 
Before developing an architecture, information was gathered to establish a sense 
of the current state of information sharing between MTS, their local, state and federal law 
enforcement partners, and TSA.  Information was gathered through interviews and 
examination of literature on technology applications, including: 
• Information on security information sharing practices followed by MTS, 
LE and intelligence agencies that share security responsibilities for surface 
transportation.  Information on current information sharing relationships 
and practices was collected so that the proposed architecture would retain 
and utilize existing practices as far as possible. The information was 
obtained through interviews (described below).   
• Case studies and literature were reviewed for information on technological 
applications and pilot projects used for local and regional information 
sharing, to gain insight into the current state of technology applications.  
This information was necessary so that the proposed architecture could 
leverage and build on existing technology, without proposing to tear them 
down.  It was found that MTS operations staff were often unaware of 
technical information relevant to the design of their systems, because they 
were designed by IT vendors with proprietary rights over the technology.  
Consequently, literature was reviewed to understand the technology, and 
the understanding was applied towards creating the architecture.    
1. Interviews 
The MTS systems and agencies interviewed were purposefully selected based on 
characteristics of the MTS industry (See Background, Chapter I, Section C), and 
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leveraging the author’s knowledge of MTS based on his work at TSA Headquarters in the 
Mass Transit Security Division.  The awareness of a need for security information 
sharing in MTS was heightened only after the terrorist attacks against passenger rail 
systems in London, Madrid and Mumbai.  The size, importance and risk to MTS systems 
around the U.S. vary; consequently the need and the infrastructure for information 
sharing mechanisms vary from agency to agency.   
A few of the largest MTS agencies ranked in the Top 5019 by ridership were 
selected, because they were likely to have the highest risk, the greatest need for 
information sharing, and likely to represent current best practices.  For example, MTS 
located in high-risk areas of the northeastern United States have large information sharing 
networks, and their operations are closely linked to local law enforcement and newly 
formed fusion centers.  Through subsequent interviews of personnel at the larger MTS 
systems, similar business practices were found.  Consequently, further interviews were 
not conducted with other large MTS, to avoid collecting repetitive information.   
Insight on information sharing for smaller transit agencies was gained during the 
interview with the Chairman of the Jacksonville Regional Domestic Security Task Force 
(described later).  It was found that smaller MTS agencies rely largely on local LE to 
address security, because of their limited security resources, risks and needs.  
Consequently, interviews did not focus on the smaller systems.  
TSA Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) personnel were interviewed because 
their information sharing technology for suspicious activities reporting is far more 
advanced than TSA’s reporting systems for surface transportation.  The architecture for 
TSA’s information sharing should be a holistic model including all modes of 
transportation.  Consequently, it is considered important to understand how law 
enforcement information is shared in aviation, to explore potential applications and 
synergies with surface transportation.   
                                                 
19 See Background Section of this thesis. 
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Information on security operations (business) practices was obtained through 
interviews with the following MTS security operations managers and their local, 
state and federal law enforcement partners: 
• Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), Boston, MA  
• Boston Police Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC), Boston, MA 
• Amtrak, focusing on operations in the northeastern corridor 
• Regional Information Sharing by the Jacksonville Regional Domestic 
Security Task Force, Jacksonville, FL 
• Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority (WMATA), Washington DC 
• TSA watchstanders at TSA’s Operations Center, called TSOC. 
• TSA field inspector, Boston, MA, serving as TSA’s field liaisons with 
MBTA. 
• TSA’s Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)  
Since the interviews encroached on Law Enforcement (LE) sensitive and For 
Official Use Only (FOUO) areas, and the author worked for a Federal oversight agency, 
reluctance to provide information was anticipated.  Consequently, the interviews were not 
formally structured, to encourage open discussion to identify underlying systemic issues 
in information sharing.  The following set of questions were asked of each interviewee:     
1. Who are the parties in your information sharing network? 
2. What types of information do you share? 
3. Do you disseminate suspicious activities reports? What other types of 
information do your reports contain?  Do you provide your LE Sensitive/ FOUO reports 
to TSA on a regular basis? 
4. What mechanisms do you use for information dissemination? (email, 
phone, conference calls, etc.).  How often, and under what circumstances, do you use 
these mechanisms? 
5. How is information with a possible terrorist nexus shared with local law 
enforcement and the FBI?   
6. What types of information do you share with TSA field offices and the 
TSOC? 
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7. Do you share information with a possible terrorist nexus, with TSA?  
8. Does TSA/ TSOC share information with you?  
Some of the questions were re-phrased when interviewing personnel from TSOC, 
because TSOC is a recipient of information from MTS, and does not originate reports on 
suspicious incidents.  Also, the author is on the distribution list for reports compiled by 
TSOC and is in a position to evaluate the information sharing first hand.   
2. Review of Cases and Literature 
Literature on case studies describing existing information sharing networks, 
technology applications, and pilot projects used for local and regional information 
sharing were reviewed, to gain insight into current information sharing issues, and 
proposed technology solutions.  These insights helped shape the proposed architecture for 
TSA, provided links with existing IT networks, and showed how to leverage them.  This 
approach would enhance information sharing in a cost effective manner without 
disrupting existing regional relationships.  The following cases, detailed in a later 
Chapter, were reviewed: 
• Study by Stevens Institute of Technology on Information Sharing for 
Network Centric Operations for the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey (PANYNJ) 
• Case study on Regional Information Joint Awareness Network (RIJAN)  
• Regional Information Sharing Technology in Jacksonville, Florida 
• Intelligence Sharing at the Philadelphia Police Department 
B. ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND REQUIREMENTS 
The information collected through interviews and reviews of case studies were 
analyzed to develop Findings (gaps).  The Findings included identification of the 
following: 
• The current state of information sharing business processes and 
technologies in local and regional networks 
• The types of information that need to be shared to enhance security 
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• The weaknesses (gaps) in information sharing processes and technologies 
used at TSA, MTS and their regional networks 
• The impact of the lack of common standards for information exchange  
• The elements of strengths demonstrated by pilot projects for inclusion in 
the proposed architecture  
Findings from the interviews, combined with that from case reviews, formed the 
basis for developing functional requirements to be met by the proposed architecture.   
C. CREATING THE ARCHITECTURE 
The final objective is to develop an architecture using open (published and 
available) technical standards for information sharing, while leveraging existing regional 
information sharing partnerships between TSA, MTS, LE and other stakeholders.  The 
following strategy, detailed in following chapters, was used: 
• Review literature describing technological concepts underlying the 
implementation of SOA, to explain to the reader how the proposed 
architecture could be applied to the needs of stakeholders involved with 
mass transit security. The architecture was built around organizational 
structures and business processes. 
• Review literature describing current federal government initiatives to 
develop an information sharing framework and data exchange model for 
broad based information sharing across all domains of homeland security.  
The purpose was to ensure that the architecture proposed by this thesis 
would be consistent with the overarching framework being developed.  
• Review literature describing open standards for information exchange, 
used widely by the private sector.  This is important for developing an 
architecture that allows TSA and MTS to exchange information with the 
private sector.   
Review literature describing the role of governance and collaboration for 
information sharing.  Briefly proposes recommendations for enhancing collaboration, and 
establishing governance for TSA’s information sharing architecture. 
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III. INTERVIEWS OF MTS OPERATORS & THEIR REGIONAL 
PARTNERS 
Interviews were conducted with MTS operators and participants in their regional 
networks, to obtain information on their current security information sharing practices.  
MTS operators and LE partners interviewed were located in Boston, Washington D.C., 
Florida, and Amtrak (which operates passenger rail service nationwide).   These are 
among the largest MTS operators in the nation and located in “high risk areas” as defined 
by TSA’s risk-based criteria for awarding Transit Security Grants.   
A. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY (MBTA),  
 BOSTON, MA20 
MBTA is one of the largest passenger transit rail systems in the U.S., and operates 
subways, commuter rail, buses and ferries.21  MBTA provides transportation to Boston 
Logan Airport, one of the nation’s busiest airports.  According to its website, the 
Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) is an independent public authority, which 
develops, promotes and manages airports, Boston seaport, and transportation 
infrastructure to enable Massachusetts and New England to compete successfully in the 
global marketplace.22  TSA’s FAMS are responsible for law enforcement and security in 
aviation matters within the airport, while the Massachusetts State Police are also 
responsible for security in the airport.  In addition, TSA’s Federal Security Director 
(FSD) for Boston has an Operations Coordination Center (OCC) at Logan airport.  TSA’s 
liaison with local rail systems are its Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs) 
from TSA’s Boston Field office, who report to the FSD. 
Given the strategic importance of Boston, MBTA’s connectivity with Logan 
airport, the various modes of transportation operated by MBTA, and the multiple 
                                                 
20 Thomas F. McCarthy (TSA Assistant Federal Security Director- Surface, Boston Field Office) 
telephone interview with author, April 2, 2008. Information in the following section is based on interview. 
21 For more information on MBTA see www.mbta.com (accessed September 9, 2008). 
22 Massachusetts Port Authority, “Logan Airport,” Massport, www.massport.com (accessed on 19 
September 2008). 
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participants involved, security information sharing is important for MBTA.   MBTA 
Police shares regional security information through daily conference calls with several 
regional participants including the Massachusetts State Fusion Center, the Boston Police 
Department’s Regional Information Center (BRIC), and TSA’s Surface Transportation 
Security Inspection Program’s (STSIP) Boston Office.   MBTA also shares information 
with the TSA’s TSOC, DHS National Operations Center (NOC), and TSA’s Federal 
Security Directors (FSD) at Boston and Rhode Island Airports.  Information sharing is a 
complex and duplicative process, because of the large number of participants and 
relationships involved.    
Incident information is reported through the TSA STSIP field representatives, 
which generally consists of the basic facts surrounding an incident or transportation 
disruption.  Normally it does not include details needed for time sensitive LE 
investigations or prosecutions.  Such information is handled by the LE arm of TSA - the 
FAMS- as described below.  
A representative from MBTA’s intelligence detective division is a member of the 
transportation security group in the FBI’s local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).  
TSA’s FAMS are represented on JTTFs around the country, including the Boston area 
JTTF.  For law enforcement investigative information or classified information connected 
with transportation, the TSA FAMS representative on the FBI JTTF keeps the TSA 
FAMS Headquarters informed.   
MBTA shares information primarily by using technology involving manual 
intervention, such as conference calls, telephone, e-mail, pagers, cell phones and radio.  
MBTA also monitors overseas intelligence and shares information with its security 
partners in the British Transport Police, New York Police Department (NYPD), Toronto 
Transit, and monitors open source information.  The MBTA Police Intelligence Unit 
publishes a weekly summary report called “MBTA Transit Police Weekly Intelligence 
Bulletin” that summarizes a variety of information categories, including the following: 
• Terrorism events overseas related to rail, transit and buses, primarily based 
on open source reporting. 
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• Weekly statistics on numbers of suspicious incidents, persons, and 
packages found on MBTA. 
• Significant events related to mass transit (local, regional, national, 
international), and upcoming anniversaries of terrorist attacks on 
international rail systems. 
• MBTA criminal information (cases of armed robbery, assault and battery, 
shootings committed on MBTA property, and photos of wanted 
individuals)   
• Boston Police Department Intelligence information (list of firearms related 
incidents and their locations, transit related crimes, photos and particulars 
of wanted persons, etc.) 
B. BOSTON POLICE REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER (BRIC), 
BOSTON, MA23 
The BRIC is part of the Boston Police Department (BPD), and is an important 
hub for information sharing with regional participants and local and regional MTS.  An 
interview was conducted to obtain relevant information about the BRIC.   The BRIC 
operates five days a week, has an operational focus, and is primarily responsible for the 
metropolitan Boston region.  It has full and part-time representatives from a variety of 
agencies, including the Massachusetts State Police, Boston Fire and Emergency 
Management Services, Suffolk County Sheriff’s Department, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the FBI, and the U.S. Coast Guard.  
Intelligence Liaison officers from eight nearby urban areas are also assigned to the BRIC.  
The Boston PD has detectives assigned to the FBI’s local JTTF for exchanging security 
information.   
The BRIC shares information with the Massachusetts State Fusion Center through 
a detective and analyst at the Fusion Center.  The BRIC shares information with DHS 
Intelligence and Analysis Division through a DHS representative at the Fusion Center.  
                                                 
23 David Carabin (Senior Intelligence Analyst, Boston Police Department) interview with author, April 
11, 2008. Information in the following section is based on the interview. 
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The DHS representative vets and forwards information from DHS to the BRIC.  The 
BRIC shares information with DHS’ National Operations Center (NOC) in Washington 
D.C. through a BRIC representative at the NOC.   The BRIC also maintains a liaison with 
the FBI’s Field Investigative Group (FIG).  A BRIC analyst has access to the FBI FIG to 
conduct searches on FBI databases.   
The BRIC shares information and communicates by phone, email and radio.  It 
holds a daily conference call with its stakeholders, including MBTA’s transit police, to 
discuss current security issues.   BRIC personnel have access to databases such as FBI’s 
Guardian, Law Enforcement Online (LEO) and DHS’s Homeland Security Information 
Network (HSIN).  BRIC uses WebEOC, a tactical tool for situational awareness, 
employing communications boards to enable interaction among participants.  It is used 
primarily during special events. 
BRIC issues two information bulletins daily to stakeholders.  Additionally, the 
BRIC provides a variety of analytic products such as crime bulletins, weekly suspicious 
activity report summaries, threat assessments, Computer Statistics (COMPSTAT),24 etc.   
C. AMTRAK25 
Amtrak operates a nationwide passenger rail transportation network of 22,000 
miles of track, and serves 21 million passengers per year at more than 500 stations.  
Amtrak has over 300 police officers located in areas of the nation that are important to 
Amtrak’s security.  In other areas, Amtrak police works with local police jurisdictions.   
Amtrak is an active participant in the North East Corridor Coalition, which is an 
important forum for rail security information sharing with the primary LE and rail 
operating agencies in the northeast corridor of the U.S.  Members of the Coalition include 
the Amtrak Police Department, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
(WMATA), Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, Virginia State Police, 
                                                 
24 For more information, see Los Angeles Police Department, “COMPSTAT,” Los Angeles Police 
Department, http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_maps_and_compstat/content_basic_view/6363 (accessed 
September 7, 2008). 
25 Neil Trugman (Detective Superintendent, Amtrak, Washington D.C.), telephone interview with 
author, April 4, 2008. Information in the following section is based on the interview.  
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Maryland Transportation Authority Police, Baltimore City Police Department, the 
Delaware State Police Criminal Intelligence Section, Philadelphia State Police 
Department, Pennsylvania State Police, New Jersey Transit Police Department, New 
Jersey State Police, and New York City Police Department (NYPD).  The NYPD works 
with the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority and the Port Authority Police 
Departments   
Amtrak is represented by its police detectives at several FBI JTTFs including 
New York City, Chicago, Washington, D.C. and at the National JTTF.  Amtrak 
detectives have access to relevant information at the JTTF in the form of reports, emails, 
Be On the Lookout alerts (BOLOs). 26 as well as through personal interaction.  Since 
TSA FAMs also participate in these JTTFs, they provide information connectivity to 
TSA.   
Amtrak receives notifications of security related events in a variety of ways.  
Passengers or the public may report events to Amtrak’s 1-800 telephone number.  
Amtrak’s 24/7 National Police Communications Center in Philadelphia or Police 
Dispatch may receive notifications from Amtrak police, train operators, conductors or 
other employees.  Notifications and information are exchanged primarily by email and 
telephone.   Conference calls hosted by Amtrak, and the Northeast Corridor Coalition, are 
important vehicles for information sharing among the participants. 
D. JACKSONVILLE REGIONAL DOMESTIC SECURITY TASK FORCE, 
FLORIDA 27 
The Jacksonville Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDTSF) has the 
primary duty to coordinate counterterrorism efforts in the Jacksonville region 
encompassing 13 counties in northeast Florida with a population of over 2 million 
                                                 
26 For more information, see Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Be On the Look Out,” Headline 
Archives, (May 26, 2004), http://www.fbi.gov/page2/may04/bolo052604.htm (accessed September 7, 
2008). 
27 Dominick Pape (Chairman, Regional Domestic Security Task Force), interview with author April 
13, 2008. The information in the following section is based on the interview. 
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residents.  Law Enforcement agencies comprised of 13 sheriffs offices, 40 local police 
departments, 10 state agencies, and a complement of federal agencies police the region.  
The region is a transportation hub with two seaports, an international airport, and 
three major interstates that traverse the region.  The Jacksonville Transportation 
Authority, an independent state agency serving Duval County, provides varied mass 
transit services. These include express and regular bus service, a downtown Skyway 
monorail, a trolley service and the Stadium Shuttle for various sporting events at 
ALLTEL Stadium.  CSX rail is a primary freight rail operator in the region with its 
Operations Center located in that region.  Amtrak passenger rail carries passenger traffic 
along the eastern corridor to Florida, using track infrastructure owned by CSX.   
The RDTSF shares information with the private transportation sector.  CSX Rail 
Operations Center and the RDTSF share information and alerts regarding threats, law 
enforcement issues, hazmat spills, accidents, traffic closures and other emergency 
management information.  Law enforcement issues experienced by Jacksonville 
Transportation Authority are usually reported to Jacksonville City Police, who in turn 
share information with the RDTSF.  
Information of significance to state and federal levels is conveyed by the RDTSF 
through appropriate channels.  Several channels of communication are used, for example: 
• The RDTSF communicates with the FBI’s regional Joint Terrorism Task 
Force (JTTF) by phone and email.  The Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement (FDLE), which is an integral part of the RDTSF, also has 
representatives at the JTTF, further facilitating information flow.  The 
JTTF vets and forwards the information to the National Joint Terrorism 
Task Force (NJTTF), and FBI Headquarters.      
• TSA’s Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) are represented on the regional 
JTTF.  Aviation related law enforcement information is conveyed directly 
to TSA Headquarters from JTTFs by the FAMs.  TSA FAMs occasionally 
communicate with the RDTSF by phone. 
• Information from the RDTSF is conveyed to a DHS Intelligence Analyst 
at the Florida State Fusion Center in Tallahassee, Florida.  The 
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Intelligence Analyst determines what information to share, and with whom 
at DHS, such as the DHS/ I&A (Intelligence & Analysis) and the DHS/ 
NOC (National Operations Center).   
• The methods used by the RDTSF are ones that are commonly used, such 
as telephone, conference calls, emails, alert notifications, and blackberry.  
The RDTSF holds conference calls with its stakeholders to provide routine 
briefings and updates, and holds urgent conference calls and issues alerts 
when necessary. 
E. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY (WMATA)28 
WMATA’s Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) assigns a police detective 
to the local FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) for exchanging intelligence 
information on matters that could have a terrorist nexus.  At the time of the interview, 
WMATA did not employ an intelligence analyst on its staff for analyzing threats, 
suspicious behavior, or for conducting trend analysis.  A MTPD police detective, 
representing the interests of MTS systems nationwide, sits on the National JTTF in 
Washington D.C. for exchanging security information affecting all MTS. 
WMATA’s Police Communications Center, also known as the Police Dispatch 
Center, communicates with the Washington Metropolitan Police Department (city police) 
in Washington D.C. for most routine law enforcement matters.  Communication is 
conducted by radio, a paging system, email and telephone.  WMATA does not use web 
based collaboration tools such as chat rooms for law enforcement.  The Metropolitan 
Police exchanges intelligence information with Fusion centers, such as the Washington 
Regional Threat and Analysis Center, in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area.    
For special events in the city such as the Fourth of July, WMATA sends a 
representative to the Metropolitan Police Department’s Joint Operations Command  
 
 
                                                 
28 Douglas Durham (Research and Planning, Metro Transit Police Department), telephone interview 
with author, March 31, 2008. Information in the following section is based on the interview.  
 24
Center (JOCC).  Seats are allocated to participating agencies depending on the needs of 
the special event.  The JOCC normally performs more of a traditional law enforcement 
function than intelligence. 
WMATA’s transit infrastructure (stations, tunnels) is monitored by CCTV 
cameras with live feeds to WMATA’s Operations Control Center (OCC) to detect 
unauthorized entry into areas not intended for passengers.  The OCC, responsible for 
monitoring rail operations on large screen wall displays, also receives phone calls from 
operations staff on issues relating to safety and train operations. 
F. FINDINGS   
• MTS participate in informal local and regional information sharing 
networks with stakeholders to meet local and regional needs.  These 
informal networks have developed over time and are accepted business 
processes for sharing information.  The networks are facilitated through 
informal relationships, and implemented through physical presence and 
interaction at common venues such as fusion or coordination centers.  
• “Islands” of information sharing exist in regions of the nation that are not 
connected to each other.  
• The primary means of information sharing are emails, conference calls, 
and telephone.  These information mechanisms are manually initiated and 
labor intensive.  Automated exchange of information between databases is 
very limited.   
• Security information typically exchanged is similar in content, with 
Suspicious Activities Reports (SARs) being the most common type of 
information exchange for antiterrorism.   
• Larger MTS have greater resources and information sharing capabilities 
than smaller MTS.  Larger MTS, such as MBTA and railroads such as 
Amtrak, have direct connectivity with robust regional information sharing 
partners, such as the FBI’s JTTF and Fusion centers.  Smaller MTS, such 
as Jacksonville Transit Authority, rely on local LE to convey information 
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to regional LE authorities.  Larger MTS, such as WMATA and MBTA 
have their own police force, while smaller MTS rely on the local LE for 
their security needs.  
G. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
1. Leverage Existing Regional Information Sharing Partnerships and IT 
Systems 
Since local and regional security information sharing partnerships between MTS 
and their LE partners exist, it only makes sense that new IT processes for information 
sharing not duplicate or tear down existing relationships, but leverage them by 
connecting smaller networks into a larger network of networks.  It is both realistic and 
economical to allow stakeholders to continue to use information systems to which they 
are already accustomed, rather than require them to migrate to a brand new system.  This 
would minimize participants’ investment in new technology and training costs, reduce the 
need to learn new processes, and thus make them more likely to participate.  The 
proposed architecture therefore, must build on existing MTS industry business practices, 
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IV. INFORMATION SHARING AT TSA29   
A. OVERVIEW 
The Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC), which maintains a 24/7 
watch, is TSA’s hub for information collection and sharing from multiple governmental 
and private sector transportation entities.  Its range of missions primarily concerns 
aviation security, and it shares information with other agencies for protection of the 
airspace in the National Capital Region.  However, the TSOC is playing an increasing 
role in sharing information for surface transportation security as discussed below.   
The TSA’s Federal Air Marshal Service’s (FAMS) law enforcement program is 
not a direct participant in surface transportation security.  However, the FAMS 
information sharing system and database is discussed because it offers elements that 
could serve as a model for surface transportation to follow.    
TSOC’s information sharing network for surface transportation provides: 
• “Upward” connectivity to DHS to its National Operations Center (NOC).  
TSA is responsible for maintaining situational awareness of the 
transportation domain, and reporting up to DHS.   When TSOC receives 
information affecting transportation infrastructure, it is also transmitted to 
the National Infrastructure Coordination Center (NICC) which is a part of 
the NOC, that is collocated with the TSOC.    
• Internal connectivity between TSOC and its customers within the rest of 
TSA.  For surface transportation, TSOC disseminates information to TSA 
Headquarters units including the Administrator’s office, Office of 
Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM), TSA Office of 
Intelligence, and others in TSA.  TSOC sends information to TSA’s 
Federal Security Directors (FSDs) located at all major airports around the 
                                                 
29 Harold Lester (Chief Watchstander for Surface Transportation, TSA), telephone interview with 
author, March 22, 2008. The author served as Branch Chief at TSA Headquarters in Mass Transit and 
Surface Transportation Security from August 2002 to July 2008.  This chapter is based on the author’s 
personal knowledge of TSA and is supplemented by interviews and TSA internal FOUO reports. 
 28
country.  It also sends information to TSA’s Surface Transportation 
Security Inspectors (STSI) in field offices, who report to the FSDs and are 
collocated with FSD offices.   The STSIs are TSA’s field liaisons with 
mass transit systems located around the country. 
• The TSOC exchanges information with external stakeholders at the 
Federal level, including the Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal 
Transit Administration (FTA), FEMA, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of 
Defense, etc.  State and local Law Enforcement agencies do not routinely 
share information with the TSOC.  Only as recently as April 2008, TSOC 
began to develop connections with several fusion centers around the 
country, and began to exchange reports by email.   
B. TYPES OF INFORMATION SHARED  
The TSOC receives incident notifications from the private transportation industry, 
TSA’s Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs) in field offices, private sector 
associations and ISACs,30 other federal government entities, the media, and other 
sources.  TSOC then compiles and disseminates situational reports (Sensitive Security 
Information) to its distribution list.  Many of these reports concern transportation 
accidents and safety related incidents rather than security, including transportation 
disruptions due to derailments, accidents, fires, hazardous materials spills, major traffic 
disruptions and closures, and other events impacting public transportation systems or 
infrastructures.  More noteworthy however is that it receives reports of suspicious 
incidents at mass transit and rail facilities, such as probable instances of terrorist 
surveillance of transportation operations or infrastructure, suspicious photography, 
suspicious derailments, vandalism, sabotage or thefts of rail equipment, missing 
employee uniforms and fires.  This information is important because it may indicate 
surveillance, probing or testing by terrorists to plan an attack.  The TSOC disseminates  
 
 
                                                 
30 Private sector Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC). 
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this information to internal TSA stakeholders for awareness, analysis and development of 
advisories and recommended protective measures for implementation by the MTS 
industry.    
Methods used by TSOC for information sharing with the surface transportation 
sector include email, telephone, and DHS’ Homeland Security Information Network 
(HSIN).  Messages are manually initiated, rather than automatically transmitted between 
databases.  TSOC has other information delivery systems, including classified systems; 
however, these are generally not utilized for surface transportation security. 
While the TSOC receives information from the private sector and MTS, generally 
it does not provide information back to industry.  TSOC collects information from 
industry mainly to provide situational awareness to TSA leadership.  However, TSA 
Headquarters periodically publishes Unclassified/ For Official Use Only (FOUO) 
Intelligence Bulletins that provide information to the transit industry on terrorist threats 
and tactics to watch for.  This information is disseminated on the HSIN - Public Transit 
portal, and also sent by email to the Top 100 transit agencies in the nation.  These 
Intelligence Bulletins also provide industry with advisories for implementing protective 
measures in the event of threats against a transportation sector or region.    
Most information generated at TSA Headquarters is in the form of policy or 
guidance to the private sector.  This information is disseminated by Transportation Sector 
Network Management (TSNM), a TSA Headquarters Division in charge of Policy and 
Planning, rather than disseminated through TSOC.  If TSA receives reports of a threat to 
the rail sector, and the information is not classified, TSA Headquarters will conduct an 
immediate conference call with the Security Coordinators of mass transit agencies, whose 
contact information is on file at TSA.  It will also send out an Alert message by email, 
blackberry and phone to the Security Coordinators.  Dissemination of classified 
information however, is generally handled through the FBI’s NJTTF which contains 
representation from the Mass Transit and passenger rail sector.  TSA’s law enforcement 
arm, the Federal Air Marshals (FAMs), who are also represented on the NJTTF, 
prosecute law enforcement cases.   
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C. INFORMATION SHARING BY TSA’S FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL 
SERVICE  
Data on information sharing processes and technology used by TSA’s Federal Air 
Marshal Service (FAMS) Law Enforcement program was collected for potential 
application and synergy with the surface transportation program.31  The FAMS’ 
technology-enabled system provides both tactical and strategic LE information sharing 
for the aviation domain.   
Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) are located at major U.S. airports, and voluntary 
information sharing agreements have been developed between FAMS and local police 
authorities in charge of securing airports and their surroundings.  Suspicious incidents 
and precursors noted by FAMs, as well as results of field interviews of suspicious 
persons conducted within the general area of the airport, are recorded as Surveillance 
Detection Reports (SDRs).  The SDRs are entered into a centralized Sequential Query 
Language (SQL) FAMS database called the Tactical Information Sharing System (TISS).  
SDRs can be filed by FAMS from various field offices via a web-based, secure system, 
using a Virtual Private Network (VPN).  FAMs can run queries on the TISS database, as 
well as query other law enforcement databases such as the FBI’s NCIC.  This allows the 
FAMs to detect similar threat patterns or anomalous incidents that may be occurring at 
different airports around the country.   
The FAMS make the TISS database accessible to an increasing number of airport 
police authorities, with local jurisdiction of the airport and its surroundings.  For 
example, the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority (MWAA), can access and enter 
security information into TISS, on a voluntary basis.  A pilot project is being conducted 
to allow selective access to TISS by TSA behavior detection officers at screening 
checkpoints, who can also enter information from computer terminals.  Access to TISS is 
also provided to several TSA’s Operations Coordination Centers (OCC), who monitor 
passenger and baggage screening operations.  The OCCs serve as a watch or operations 
center for TSA to communicate with other agencies in the airport, such as MWAA’s 
                                                 
31 Paul Greenan, (Tactical Information Branch, FAMS) telephone interview with author, May 23, 
2008.  
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Operations Center.  Thus, the FAMS information sharing network enables immediate, 
tactical information to be shared with those LE personnel who need to act in time to 
prevent or preempt an incident or threat from occurring in the airport area.  The TISS 
database also provides the FAMS with data to conduct strategic analysis of emerging 
threats, trends and patterns, consistent with privacy, legal and other mandates.   
FAMS personnel represent TSA at FBI’s JTTFs around the U.S.  The connectivity 
with the FBI facilitates, for example, the detection and apprehension of repeat offenders, 
BOLOs,32 fugitives and criminals identified by the FBI or other LE agencies, as they 
attempt to fly out of U.S. airports.      
D. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
1. Surface Transportation 
• TSA is unable to effectively “connect the dots” across MTS around the 
nation to identify emerging threats, and develop a national threat picture 
for transportation.  Consequently, TSA cannot provide information to 
MTS in a timely way to assist them to prevent, prepare and respond to 
threats to surface transportation security.  No comprehensive information 
sharing system, inclusive of all modes of transportation security, has been 
developed by TSA.  This has remained a significant gap in TSA’s 
responsibilities since its inception, for ensuring the security of all modes 
of transportation.   
• No technology-based system has been established for TSOC to 
automatically pull information directly from MTS, Fusion Centers and LE 
databases.  Instead, the TSOC relies on MTS to send reports by email or 
phone to TSOC, which is a labor intensive, manual process.  It is 
burdensome for MTS personnel to provide status updates and reports to 
TSOC when MTS are busy responding to a threat or incident.   
 
                                                 
32 FBI, “Be on the Look Out.” 
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Consequently the process is unreliable for timely data collection and is 
likely to result in incomplete data for the end user and increases the 
potential for them to miss key information.  
• Where a nexus to terrorism or federal crime is suspected, MTS and local 
LE report them to the local FBI JTTF, and increasingly to State Fusion 
Centers, as they are established and their capabilities mature.  MTS have a 
greater incentive to report incidents to LE and Fusion Centers and first 
responders because they can immediately act on the information and 
provide MTS with needed and timely assistance.  Consequently the TSOC 
should connect, via automated means, with Fusion Centers, and a larger 
group of HS participants that have timely information. 
• Observations of subtle, suspicious activity may not always be reported to 
TSOC, because they may not appear significant enough at the time to 
warrant reporting. Later however, such observations may turn out to be 
important for detecting an emerging threat pattern.   Consequently, TSOC 
should obtain a broader range of reports from stakeholders, and use 
automation to collect and categorize the larger volume of reports obtained. 
• TSOC’s dissemination of reports concerning transportation accidents, 
hazmat spills and traffic disruptions are duplicative of similar 
transportation safety related functions that have long been performed by 
other agencies in the Department of Transportation (DOT).  While this 
information is useful for providing situational awareness, the TSOC 
should not expend resources re-compiling transportation accident reports 
that have already been compiled by another federal agency.   
2. Federal Air Marshal Service 
While TISS is an automated system to share information for LE operations in 
aviation, TSA’s surface transportation security program does not have a comparable 
program.  TISS provides a technology model that could be applied to surface 
transportation security.  It is noted that TISS does not have automatic connectivity with 
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databases that house security information from TSA’s airport screening operations, 
implemented by TSA’s Office of Security Operations.   
The stovepiping of information systems within TSA mirrors its organizational 
structure, where TISS is owned by TSA FAMS, while Surface Transportation Security 
falls under TSA-TSNM (Transportation Security Network Management), and airport 
screening operations is the responsibility of TSA-Office of Security Operations (OSO).  
This deficiency in information sharing within TSA is a result of a lack of organizational 
collaboration, rather than unavailability of information sharing technology. 
E. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
1. Accommodate Numerous Public Transportation Agencies of Varying 
Size, Complexity, Technological Capability and Funding Resources   
Background on the MTS industry and findings show that there is a wide variation 
in the needs and capability for information sharing among MTS across the nation.  It 
depends on their scale of operations, geographic location, funding resources, ridership 
levels and risk perception.  High ridership and dependence on public transportation in 
large urban cities like Washington D.C., New York and Boston, and the higher risk and 
consequent need to protect passenger rail agencies in these cities, are commonly 
recognized.  The perception of risk is higher in the New York and Washington D.C. 
because of the direct impact of 9/11, with Boston not located far away.  Consequently, 
security information sharing arrangements of MTS in these areas are more mature, in 
contrast to smaller MTS operations in other parts of the U.S. with lower ridership, and 
lower levels of risk, resource and information sharing capability.  
MTS agencies are owned and funded by various local and state governments and 
do not fall under federal jurisdiction.  Also the risk and information needs of each region 
are likely to remain different.  Therefore, a “one size fits all” information sharing scheme 
is unrealistic.  Consequently, the architecture must be scalable to meet the needs of 
varying sizes and needs of MTS operators, as they join the information sharing process at 
different points in their development cycle 
 
 34
2. Enable Information Sharing with HS Communities Outside MTS  
A terrorist, who targets transportation systems or uses transportation to reach his 
target, is not restricted to the transportation domain alone.  The terrorist travels between 
cities, hides in our communities, and may be associated with money laundering, drug 
trafficking or other crimes.  Consequently, information that may help prevent a terrorist 
from targeting transportation systems could come from communities outside 
transportation, such as local, regional or federal LE, as well as security partners in other 
modes of transportation.   
The range of partners with whom information must be shared is not easy to 
define, and at the outset the parties may not share a common set of objectives or 
understanding of the process.  While some of the partners with whom MTS information 
are shared are obvious, such as LE and intelligence, HS increasingly requires information 
sharing among a growing array of non-traditional partners such as the private sector, fire 
and emergency management services and the medical community.   Given the 
interconnectedness between HS domains, portions of information pertinent to 
transportation security may also be relevant to other communities of interest and vice 
versa.  Each community has different requirements - an officer on scene must have 
immediate access to succinct information, while others need strategic information for 
detecting emerging patterns or threats.  The privacy, security levels and roles of the 
stakeholder determines who is allowed to access different types of information.   
Modes of transportation are interconnected – a terrorist may travel on a passenger 
rail car to an airport, then fly to a different city and drive on the highway to his 
destination.  This requires that TSA work to share information between transportation 
modes, rather than keep aviation and surface transportation in separate silos. Therefore, 
the architecture should enable information to be exchanged with a broader range of HS 
partners beyond MTS, to include all modes of transportation.   
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V. REVIEW OF CASES & LITERATURE ON REGIONAL 
INFORMATION SHARING  
A. STUDY ON INFORMATION SHARING AND NETWORK CENTRIC 
OPERATIONS, BY STEVENS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, NEW 
JERSEY 
The study highlights the complexity of information sharing in the large regional 
network of the bi-state area of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
(PANYNJ).33  It involves multiple partners at federal, state, local and private sector 
levels that share overlapping jurisdictions for transportation security.  It illustrates how 
the jurisdictional lines in the complex bi-state region are not always clear, and 
complicates the ability to direct the numerous organizations with overlapping security 
roles and responsibilities, without duplication of effort.  Consequently, a strictly 
hierarchical model for information sharing would be inconsistent with existing regional 
organizational relationships and authorities.  The study illustrates how information 
sharing can provide a common understanding of threats and vulnerabilities among 
agencies with complex relationships, and enhance the speed and effectiveness of 
prevention and response. 
The study is relevant to this thesis because PANYNJ, and New York Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (MTA), are responsible for the security of multiple modes of 
transportation including aviation, passenger rail, buses, highway and shipping.  It also 
owns or operates some of the nation’s most critical and well-known transportation assets.  
The proposed architecture for TSA similarly involves sharing information between MTS 
that are owned by various state and local jurisdictions, and other non-transportation HS 
partners, who are not part of a hierarchical federal structure. 
The PANYNJ is responsible for:  
• Airports (JFK, LaGuardia, Newark)  
                                                 
33 Jerry M. Hultin, Michael Pennotti, Harlan Ullman, and  Leslie A. Stevens, Securing the Port of New 
York and New Jersey: Network-Centric Operations Applied to the Campaign Against Terrorism (Hoboken 
N.J. Stevens Institute of Technology, 2004), 97-117.  
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• Mass Transit (Port Authority TransHudson / PATH).  The PATH system 
serves as the primary transit link between Manhattan and neighboring 
New Jersey urban communities and suburban railroads.  
• Marine terminals in the Port ( Elizabeth, Brooklyn, Red Hook) 
• Lincoln and Holland Tunnels 
• George Washington and Verazzano Narrows Bridges.   
New York MTA includes New York City Transit, Staten Island Railway (part of 
NYC Transit's Department of Subways), Long Island Rail Road, Long Island Bus, Metro-
North Railroad, MTA Bridges and Tunnels, and MTA Capital Construction.  MTA’s 
subways, buses, and railroads provide 2.4 billion trips each year to New Yorkers — the 
equivalent of about one in every three users of mass transit in the United States and two-
thirds of all the nation's rail riders. MTA bridges and tunnels carry more than 300 million 
vehicles a year — more than any bridge and tunnel authority in the nation.    
B. CASE STUDY – REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING JOINT 
AWARENESS NETWORK (RIJAN) 
The case study by Paczkowski (2007) builds on the groundwork laid by the 
Stevens Institute study and describes a prototype IT-based system called the Regional 
Information Joint Awareness Network (RIJAN).34  It is a regional, web-based, 
information sharing network for information sharing for situational awareness among 
regional stakeholders for securing the PANYNJ.  The thesis applies concepts from 
RIJAN’s technology architecture to develop an architecture for TSA for sharing 
information with its surface transportation partners.  
The study addresses the problem of information sharing among regional partners 
similar to that faced by TSA, MTS and HS partners on a nationwide scale.  The study 
emphasizes the need for information sharing by citing deficiencies faced during the 
response to 9/11, the response to Hurricane Katrina, in DHS Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN), and from lessons learned from Top Officials (TOPOFF) 
                                                 
34 John Paczkowski, “A Case Study in the Development and Application of Information Sharing and 
Collaboration Technology” (unpublished research paper from IS 4010, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
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Exercises.  It provides an example of how disparate systems can be connected to form the 
larger RIJAN network, without requiring existing networks to be replaced.  It highlights 
the fact that stakeholders would be much more willing to link their existing information 
sharing systems through the Internet than develop a brand new and expensive system.  
The paper also provides insight into how regional operations centers are connected, and 
achieve shared situational awareness using graphical user interfaces and common 
collaboration tools.   
RIJAN virtually connects the following participating agencies that operate 
transportation infrastructure or play an important role in protecting it: 
• Operations Centers of New York State Office of Homeland Security,  
• the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ),  
• the New York City (NYC) Office of Emergency Management (NYC 
OEM) and other NYC government organizations,  
• the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and,  
• the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (NJ 
OHSP).    
RIJAN provides shared situational awareness and a common operating picture for 
security events and other emergencies.  This enables coordinated, collective decision 
making by senior leaders of the agencies involved, and reduces the time between the 
receipt of an alert, a decision and taking action.  It facilitates the real time monitoring and 
rapid exchange of vital information to detect emerging threats, and rapid response to 
emergencies.  RIJAN includes video (for example, for monitoring critical 
infrastructures), sensor data, geographic information systems (GIS) mapping, 
visualization and other collaboration tools to enable decision making.RIJAN is a 
metropolitan area network primarily used by its regional participants to share information 
to respond to threats and manage emergencies.  Most of the information is maintained 




Features of RIJAN relevant for developing the proposed architecture are: 
•  Each of the participating agencies send and receive information 
from their respective agency databases to a centralized RIJAN database.  
Participating agencies do not draw information directly from each other, 
but from the central database using a hub and spoke architecture.   
• Information is stored and retrieved from the RIJAN database by 
participating organizations using a Publish and Subscribe server (PASS).  
PASS is the interface that accepts XML feeds and distributes XML 
messages to other RIJAN participants.  This important feature provides a 
means for new data sources to be integrated quickly into RIJAN without 
disturbing current data sources, providing room to accommodate future 
growth and information needs.    
• User Interface Features:  Users in RIJAN enter information on web-based 
forms designed for pre-defined categories such as Situation Reports, 
Action, Intelligence and Alert.  After data is submitted, it is packaged into 
an XML message and published on the RIJAN network by the PASS 
server.  Other agencies who participate in RIJAN are subscribers to the 
published information and can access it.   
• RIJAN anticipates instances where information may need to be shared 
with authorized users and applications outside the RIJAN metropolitan 
network.  It is capable of providing addressing and services to allow 
authorized external users to access RIJAN information across the Internet.   
An external user with a standard PC can access RIJAN using a VPN for 
security.  The Internet gateway authenticates the user and provides a portal 
for navigation to its applications.  The gateway provides the security and 
control that separates the Internet from the internal RIJAN network.  The 
external user can be restricted in functionality for performance or policy 
reasons.   
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• Security and Authentication Features:  RIJAN provides interfaces with 
each participating agency with a secure network gateway.  This allows 
RIJAN to maintain separate control and security, based on administrative 
policies between RIJAN and each agency.35   
User Access from an agency uses Secure Socket Layer (SSL), Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) connections.  This is a standard, secure level of communication using an 
Internet browser for access.  The user starts a browser and types in HTTPS: SSL VPN, 
then the Uniform Resource Locator (URL)36 address of the RIJAN firewall.   RIJAN will 
route this to its authentication server, which will prompt the user for a User Identification 
(ID) and Password.  Once users are authenticated, they are routed to the portal page.  The 
portal provides navigation to applications and other functions.  In addition to IDs and 
passwords, users are assigned access depending on the security level of the data they are 
allowed to access: Open, FOUO or Law Enforcement (LE) Sensitive.       
RIJAN can pull information from websites, email or other sources and format it.  
It can e-mail alerts and convert email messages into an alert message. 
C. CASE STUDY - REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING IN 
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA 37 
This real world case study is instructive in demonstrating how information 
sharing technology was used to enable the sharing of all-crimes information in the 
Jacksonville region, including transportation.   This section addresses technology 
concepts, while the business processes used in information sharing are included in the 
chapter on interviews.   
                                                 
35 RIJAN is viewed as an extranet by the agencies.  Each agency has a firewall which connects to the 
RIJAN firewall.  The agency allocates a block of IP addresses from its network that is routed through its 
firewall.  The RIJAN firewall takes those addresses, and translates them into the RIJAN private network 
addresses. 
36 Sun Microsystems, Inc, “Class URL,” (2004), 
http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/api/java/net/URL.html (accessed September 7, 2008). Uniform 
Resource Locator is a pointer to a "resource" on the World Wide Web. A resource can be a file, directory, a 
query to a database or to a search engine. 
37 Dominick Pape, “Case Study: Southeast Law Enforcement Alliance Project” (unpublished research 
paper for course materials from IS 4010, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).  
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The primary role of the Jacksonville Regional Domestic Security Task Force 
(RDTSF) is to coordinate counterterrorism efforts in the Jacksonville region 
encompassing 13 counties in northeast Florida, with a population of over 2 million 
residents.  Each agency in the RDSTF had its own methods of storing law enforcement 
information, and information was not easily shared among them.  To alleviate this, 
RDSTF leadership made it a priority to share all-crimes information, because terrorists 
could also commit traditional crimes such as drug trafficking, money laundering, bank 
robbery, and illegal weapon trafficking to finance their terrorism.  State and local law 
enforcement officers could have routine encounters with terrorists, as was the case with 
several of the September 11 hijackers. Therefore, sharing all-crimes information could 
help identify a terrorist before he committed a terrorist act. 
To achieve all crimes information sharing, the RDTSF employed the Law 
Enforcement Information Exchange (LInX) system.  It is used to collect, process, store, 
analyze and disseminate law enforcement data from multiple sources, and respond to user 
queries in a usable form.  Its purpose is to share information among city, county, state 
and federal LE agencies to solve crime, protect local communities and identify any nexus 
to terrorism.   
By sharing information from databases across jurisdictions and maintaining 
records in databases, it enables analysts to connect incidents that have occurred at 
different jurisdictions and times to look for a nexus between them.  Presently LInX 
connects about 2,000 users from 31 Florida, 8 Georgia and 2 Federal LE agencies.  
The introduction of LInX encountered the common problem of connecting a 
variety of disparate technological systems used by participant agencies.  Systems ranged 
from advanced to paper-based information systems, to none.  
The RDTSF had to choose between an architecture using distributed databases of 
the participating agencies versus a centralized data warehouse.  The distributed 
architecture would require the query of the servers of all agencies, which could involve 
over 20 servers, to respond to a single request.  Instead, RDTSF chose the data warehouse 
concept that uses a single, centralized data warehouse with normalized data, which the 
query searches upon request.  
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Participating agencies make two types of queries from agency databases: tactical 
and analytical.  Tactical queries are normally made from the perspective of the uniformed 
officer on the street, to search for people, vehicles, addresses, incidents or a combination 
thereof.  Advanced analytical queries are made from the perspective of analysts and 
detectives, to link and solve crimes.  It allows advanced searches, link analysis and free 
text searches.   
Participating agencies contribute data to the central data warehouse.  The 
information exchange is based on Global Justice XML standards, which allows data 
exchange between different computer systems.  The system is based on an open 
architecture to facilitate the inclusion of other agencies that may wish to participate in the 
future, and to include new technological applications. The system uses a standard secure 
web browser to access the data.    
Participating agencies contribute LE information such as incident reports, case 
records, field interview contact cards, arrest information, dispatch events, traffic citations, 
mug shots, pawn data, and investigative reports.  Each agency refreshes their information 
on a daily basis to provide close to real-time information.  After the data is pushed by an 
agency to the data warehouse, the data is normalized to facilitate a single server query.   
Leadership and an effective governance structure were instrumental in the success 
of this information sharing partnership.  It created value, inspired trust and demonstrated 
a true partnership.  This allowed the technology to be accepted and implemented.  Similar 
models of information sharing partnerships using LInX technology are being 
implemented in other parts of the U.S., including the National Capital Region, Hampton 
Roads, VA, New Mexico, Oregon, Hawaii and Texas.  
D. CASE STUDY - PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT 
A case study by Castro provides an excellent example of the consequences of the 
Philadelphia Police Department’s (PPD) inability to share information with surrounding 
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police districts due to databases that could not communicate with each other.38 This 
example concerns transportation infrastructure and applies to transportation security in 
other respects as well.  Philadelphia shares four bridges with the State of New Jersey, 
each located within different police districts in the city.  If police from each of the four 
districts in Philadelphia and New Jersey investigated the same individual who 
photographed each bridge from both sides of the respective jurisdiction, none of the 
officers would know about the investigation conducted by the other districts.  If the same 
individual had been observed engaging in photography or other suspicious activity by 
private sector security staff, this information may not be shared with the PPD.  The 
inability to share information about suspicious behavior prevents the police from 
detecting, preventing, or preempting a terrorist act.  This example applies to 
transportation systems where information regarding individuals found photographing 
MTS infrastructures in different cities across the U.S., may not be shared among MTS 
and TSA.  The study states that the inability to share information stemmed from a culture, 
policies and governance that allowed technological stovepipes to be developed. 
E. REVIEW OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES REPORTS AND RELATED 
LITERATURE 
Based on a review of information and reports shared between MTS, its security 
partners and TSA, reports of suspicious incidents, commonly called Suspicious Activities 
Reports (SARs), were found to be the most common type of information shared for the  
prevention of terrorism, especially among the LE community.  SARs document the 
observation of behavior that may be indicative of intelligence gathering or pre-
operational planning related to terrorism, criminal or other illicit intentions, particularly 
activities with a potential nexus to terrorism. 
Similar to MBTA’s Transit Police Weekly Intelligence Bulletin described earlier, 
reports are also published by several other agencies on a LE Sensitive/ FOUO basis.  
Examples include reports published by TSA’s TSOC, TSA FAMS (SDRs), Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority Police of New York, Amtrak, Highway Watch (an Information 
                                                 
38 Daniel Castro, “Interagency Intelligence Sharing Research Paper,” (unpublished research paper 
from IS 4010 Naval Postgraduate School, 2005). 
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Sharing and Analysis Center for highway transportation), NYPD Shield, and State Fusion 
Centers.  While the presentation, format, scope, dissemination and distribution of reports, 
and depth of reporting used by various agencies vary, the fundamental content of the 
reports are similar.   The author’s review of sample reports (LE/ FOUO) show that they 
may be broken down into commonly used categories, such as thefts, drug related 
offences, shootings, and reports of suspicious activities and surveillance, often including 
photographs and descriptions of suspicious persons.  While each agency refers to their 
report by a unique name or title, the content of the various reports are fundamentally the 
same.  These reports are usually disseminated among local or regional stakeholders by 
email.  A paper (Homeland Security Institute, 2007) describing SARs information 
sharing issues in the National Capitol Region (NCR) provides insight into SARs for 
MTS.   According to the paper, reports from the 9/11 attacks, the 2002 Bali nightclub 
attacks, 2004 Madrid train bombings, 2005 London transit bombings and other notorious 
terrorist attacks all show that terrorists’ conduct pre-attack surveillance to prepare for an 
ttack on their target.  Consequently several NCR entities have instituted counter-
surveillance programs to detect surveillance activities of potential terrorist operatives or 
criminals who observe deployed security measures such as locations of security cameras, 
times of shift changes for security, choke points in transportation systems, and other key 
characteristics of potential targets.   
Each NCR entity has developed SARs systems to detect, record, track SARs 
information.39  While several SARS databases exist in the NCR however, the databases 
neither interface with each other, nor provide a capability to search across databases, 
which exist in different formats.   
The lack of connectivity across databases and sectors makes it difficult for LE 
ands Intelligence to collect information for analysis to detect emerging threats.  For 
example, a vehicle or person may be reported to MTS or local LE for taking photographs 
of transportation infrastructure such as critical electrical systems, bridges or tunnel 
entrances for important MTS in a large U.S. city.  A few days later similar surveillance 
                                                 
39 NCR entities include the Federal Protective Service, U.S. Department of State, Counter Intelligence 
Field Activity, and the Federal Air Marshal Service. 
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on MTS infrastructure may be observed in a different city.  Since MTS databases do not 
automatically share information, the potential connectivity between these two apparently 
disparate surveillance events may not be noticed, and an emerging threat pattern may be 
missed by TSA and the MTS community.   
Using a standard format and criteria to record these incidents and observations in 
databases, would facilitate automated information exchange and the analysis necessary 
“to connect the dots” to detect emerging threats.  However, there are no standards for 
MTS SARs to augment protection efforts by detecting pre-attack surveillance and 
detection of suspicious activities.  A significant problem is the lack of a common 
terminology and definition of suspicious behavior that would ensure that similar 
information is reported, recorded and shared, to reduce false positives.  There is also a 
range of judgments and practices about what is considered operationally relevant 
suspicious activity or pre-attack behavior.   
It is also not easy to define the nature of the terrorism information that must be 
shared.  It is nearly impossible to predict exactly which types of information, insight, or 
expertise will be required to detect, prevent, prepare for, respond to, and mitigate the 
effects of a terrorist attack.  The information to be shared spans “terrorism information”40 




                                                 
40 Briefly, IRPTA 1016(a)(4) defines “terrorism information” as (a) all information relating to the 
existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities or activities of domestic or 
international terrorists, (b) threats posed by such groups to the U.S. and its interests, (c) communications by 
such groups, or (d) those reasonably believed to be assisting or associated with such groups. See Program 
Manager, Information Sharing Environment, Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2006), 153.   
41 Section 892(f)(1) of the Homeland Security Act (6 USC 482(f)(1) defines “homeland security 
information” as any information possesses by a Federal, State or local agency that (a) relates to the threat of 
terrorist activity, (b) relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity, (c) would 
improve the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist organization, or(d) improve 
the response to a terrorist act. See PM-ISE, Implementation Plan, 150. 
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information.42  The overlap of information possessed by various agencies and 
communities has led to challenges in defining roles, missions and responsibilities for 
homeland security information sharing.43   
Information sharing must occur among systems and databases that differ widely 
in software, hardware, operating systems and design.  Since all participants will not be at 
the same point in the development of their technology, legacy systems will need to be 
accommodated by the network.  Hoyt and Baicar (June 2005)44 state that data storage 
mechanisms in the public domain vary in their types and levels of sophistication.  Some 
jurisdictions maintain data in low-level databases such as Microsoft Access or a version 
of Dbase.  In some cases old mainframe computers are still used, and access to stored 
information is limited.  Medium to large jurisdictions have implemented data storage 
mechanisms such as Oracle or Sybase, among others.  Smaller jurisdictions at local and 
state levels may not be able to expend their limited resources on research and 
development of systems, which heightens the need for leveraging existing systems.  
State fusion centers are important nodes in the information sharing network for 
HS45 (PM-ISE Implementation Plan, p.30).  The architecture for TSA must be designed 
to enable and enhance information flow through fusion centers.  Statewide and major 
urban area fusion centers were established to create a unified federal interface that can be 
customized to meet State, Local, Territorial and Tribal (SLTT) government needs.  
Fusion centers act as primary connecting links between federal agencies and SLTT 
governments.  The centers in turn, collaborate with the FBI’s JTTFs, Field Investigation 
Groups (FIGs), and the private sector.  A primary function of fusion centers is to 
customize federally supplied information for dissemination to meet regional and local  
 
                                                 
42 Law enforcement information for the purpose of information sharing is defined on p.151, PM-ISE, 
Implementation Plan. 
43 PM-ISE, Implementation Plan, 111. 
44 John Hoyt and Bruce Baicar, “Info Tech Methodology for Data Integration” (unpublished research 
paper for SPAWAR System Center), 2005. 
45 PM-ISE, Implementation Plan, 30. 
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needs.  Similarly locally and regionally generated information is gathered, processed, 
analyzed, and interpreted by fusion centers for dissemination to federal agencies at the 
national level.   
F. FINDINGS 
• A hierarchical model for information sharing is unrealistic and impractical 
for the complex, overlapping jurisdictions and authorities involved in 
MTS security. 
• Networks such as RIJAN46 and LInX work well for regional information 
sharing within those regions where they have been established.  However 
they do not allow information sharing between regions or on a nationwide 
basis.  While it increases the probability of detecting linkages between 
crime and terrorism within regions, it does not “connect the dots” across 
the nation.  
• SARs are important for preventing terrorism, and are the most commonly 
used method for sharing security information.  
• Lack of standard format and terminology used in SARs makes it difficult 
to exchange information that provides a common understanding of threats. 
• Lack of connectivity across databases make it difficult for TSA, MTS, LE 
agencies and Intelligence to detect emerging threats. 
• Information sharing must occur among systems and databases that differ 
widely in software, hardware, operating systems and design.   
• Technology for information sharing must be designed to enable and 
enhance information flow through fusion centers. 
G. REQUIREMENTS 
Based on the findings, the architecture should meet the following requirements:  
                                                 
46 John Paczkowski, “A Case Study.” 
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• Enable TSA to share information with a broad range of MTS and HS 
partners using non-hierarchical, federated networks, by creating and 
appropriate IT architecture and governance structure. 
• Enable the exchange of data and information between regional networks, 
such as RIJAN and LInX, and provide TSA a nationwide picture for 
transportation security. 
• Enable TSA to facilitate the effective sharing of SARs for the discovery 
and analysis of potential terrorism related patterns and trends.  TSA is the 
overarching agency responsible for doing so on a national basis – function 
not being fulfilled by any other.  TSA should also facilitate SAR 
information sharing on a regional basis to make its mission more effective. 
• Enable automated communication between disparate computer systems 
and databases, including legacy systems.  The architecture must adapt to 
changing hardware and software technology for information sharing.    
• The architecture must be dynamic and adapt to changing partnerships and 
requirements as HS needs evolve.  HS strategies and programs continue to 
evolve across all levels of government and the private sector, and will 
continue to do so in the foreseeable future, as the nascent multi-
disciplinary field of HS matures.  Therefore, TSA must promote a 
scalable, open-architecture information sharing system than can adapt to, 
and be flexible enough to easily accommodate rapid evolutions in HS.  
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VI. WHY LEVERAGE SOA? DHS FRAMEWORK & STANDARDS 
FOR INFORMATION SHARING  
This chapter explains the concept of SOA and why leveraging it enables the 
requirements developed earlier to be met effectively, and close the gaps in information 
sharing.   While SOA helps connect disparate computer systems and databases, it relies 
extensively on open standards such as eXtensible Markup Language (XML) to identify 
and provide meaning to the information being shared.  To share information with other 
domains of HS, the proposed architecture must fit within DHS’ overall information 
sharing framework and data exchange standards currently being developed.  This chapter 
is divided into the following sections: 
A. Why leverage SOA? Application to TSA Information Sharing 
B. Application of XML in Information Sharing 
C. DHS Framework and Standards for Information Sharing  
A. WHY SOA? APPLICATION TO TSA INFORMATION SHARING 
The concept of SOA enables communication between autonomous web-based 
services (databases, computer systems, purpose-specific software) each of which is 
independently managed and implemented.  Communication is enabled through the use of 
commonly used, published standards for describing the data that is exchanged, and the 
use of transforms to translate between data formats and semantics used by different 
systems and databases.  Since SOA “loosely couples” services, it enables any  computer 
to communicate with any computer, and allows new information sharing partners to join 
or leave the network, as MTS and HS information sharing needs evolve.47    
SOA is a loose coupling of computer systems, databases and service providers 
connected via the Internet.  It allows any HS partner to communicate with any HS 
                                                 
47 Global Infrastructure Standards Working Group, A Framework for Justice Information Sharing: 
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA,) (September 2004), U.S. Department of Justice, 
http://www.it.oip.gov/process_links.jsp?link_id=4428 (accessed on 19 September 08); and Sandeep 
Chatterjee and James Webber, Developing Enterprise Web Services – An Architect’s Guide (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 2004). 
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partner, facilitating unprecedented decentralized interoperability between HS partners 
and their computer systems.  The interoperability is enabled by the use of open, published 
standards for data exchange that have been ubiquitously implemented by industry and 
government worldwide.   
The terms “autonomous”, “independent”, “agreements” and “federated” capture 
the spirit of SOA.  It is consistent with the autonomous structure of the MTS industry 
where transit systems are owned and operated by sundry state, local or private entities, 
that are not part of a hierarchical, regulated, federal structure.  SOA involves thinking of 
the parts of a given system as a set of relatively autonomous services, each of which is 
independently managed and implemented, which are linked together with a set of 
agreements and protocols into a federated structure.”48   The agreements are about the 
mutual understanding of what information will be shared with whom.   
SOA reflects the philosophy of the Internet, in which there is a reduced need for 
day to day centralized administration.   According to Harbitter (undated), the lack of 
centralization has been the reason for the Internet’s success.  Its success, scope, and 
incredible growth are a direct result of good technology standards, distributed 
governance, independence of participants, and strong mutual benefits for participation.  
The Internet is the ultimate distributed system, and the same reasons that made it 
successful can make SOA successful.   
Leveraging SOA offers several advantages that fulfills the requirements 
established for TSA/ MTS information sharing.  SOA: 
• Allows loose coupling of systems, thus adding unprecedented flexibility 
for making changes, and scalability for growth as MTS and HS needs 
evolve.  SOA contrasts with traditional architecture designs, which are 
monolithic, centralized systems, based on a large central sever, and 
departmental systems based on a closed local area network.  The 
monolithic framework requires every participant to be part of a single, 
rigid, comprehensive system.  The system could not be changed without 
                                                 
48 Global Infrastructure, A Framework, 10.  
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impacting all participants and taking into account all of the functions they 
performed.  It would be difficult and expensive to adapt to evolving 
business needs even within a single agency, and likely impossible to do so 
for the MTS/ HS community nationwide.  Custom integration takes time, 
is user specific and very costly.  In contrast, the “loose coupling” of SOA 
allows collaborative partners (sources and destinations of information) to 
be added or dropped from the information sharing network, depending on 
evolving needs.  It facilitates the growth of new collaborative partnerships 
that are fluid, and can be configured “on the fly”.   
• Enables decentralized information sharing and storage, consistent with the 
decentralized nature of the MTS industry and its HS partners.  SOA does 
not require an agency to send its records to a central database over which 
the originating agency has no control.   An agency can share only the data 
it wishes to share, by agreement.  This allows each agency to refresh its 
data and keep it current, improving the quality and timeliness of data 
shared.  If a centralized data warehouse model were used, the update of 
data and maintenance of its quality would be difficult, as the central data 
custodian would likely be unaware of ongoing changes within the myriad 
partner organizations in HS.     
• Facilitates the exchange of selected, useful but not unnecessary data.  This 
is important to prevent an analyst from being deluged with unnecessary 
and repetitive data, which may not be worth analyzing, nor whose analysis 
is practical with constrained resources.   
• Offers advantages to small MTS agencies as it reduces their cost of 
developing elaborate IT systems by sharing services, and allowing them 
the ability to tap into the larger information sharing network.   
SOA automates the information sharing process, and reduces the effort and 
human error associated with manually composing and sending emails, and making phone 
calls on a one-to-one basis.  It is ideally suited for connecting geographically and 
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technologically disparate sources and systems of information, while retaining and 
leveraging existing systems, minimizing cost and duplication of effort.   
The author’s vision of how SOA would work, in concept, to share information 
among MTS, is based on concepts in Tang and Selwood.49  When an information 
provider (for example, a fusion center, a MTS, a LE agency) offers a new service (for 
example, Suspicious Activities Reports, BOLO notices), the provider publishes details in 
registry, about what the service does and how to interact with it.  A registry is like the 
“Yellow Pages”, and contains details of published services, which a service consumer can 
look up to find the service he needs (a report in this case).  Consumers (such as TSA, 
other MTS or LE agencies or applications) can discover and identify this service by 
automatically searching the registry via the Internet.  In limited situations, the consumer 
may already know the Uniform Resource Locator (URL)50 at which the information 
resides and can connect to it directly, rather than look up the registry.  The registry 
provides access on an Internet scale, to information published by other communities, to 
promote information sharing between and across HS communities. Once the information 
source is identified, the consumer (example TSA) uses the service by sending a request 
and receiving a response over the Internet, as a web service.   
SOA offers electronic services across the web, called web services. A web 
service, for example, can be a response from a remote computer system to a search query, 
say, for a Suspicious Activity Report.  The available services are posted in a registry.  If a 
computer program is searching for information, the program can see what services are 
offered, and request information from appropriate services.  Well-defined standards are 
used for specifying the services, formatting the provided information, and identifying  
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50 Sun Microsystems, Inc, “Class URL,” (2004), 
http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/api/java/net/URL.html (accessed September 7, 2008). Uniform 
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service users (clients) to service providers.  Another example of a web service could be 
fetching additional information related to the name of a person involved in suspicious 
behavior.   
Web services expose only their capabilities to clients, not their implementations 
(i.e., the internal workings of the service – their programming language, operating 
system, etc., are not exposed to the client’s system).  Each web service is a self-contained 
building block.  It describes its own capabilities, publishes its own programmatic 
interface, and implements its own functionality.  The client application simply invokes 
the functionality of a web service by sending it messages, receives return messages, and 
then uses the results within the clients’ applications.   This allows web services to be 
implemented in any language and on any platform and still be compatible with client 
applications. Therefore TSA systems can communicate with systems of MTS and HS 
partner agencies, regardless of how they implement their systems, as long as they are 
published as web services.   
SOA-based information sharing allows each MTS and HS agency to remain 
responsible for their information in their databases, since they possess the best knowledge 
of their information.  TSA can simply tap into those databases using SOA, provide its 
own value added contribution, and expose it on the web for its partners to use.   The SOA 
process concentrates on how data and commands are passed between computers in 
different organizations, without interfering with or changing the business processes or 
applications within the organizations that are connected.  SOA provides a framework for 
describing how to pass commands to a particular application and how to understand its 
response.  Almost any application can be published as a web service, whether developed 
specifically as a web service or a legacy system that has been around.  This makes SOA 
eminently suitable for connecting HS information databases, some of which are new, 
some old and others to be established in the future, as HS requirements and capabilities 
develop. 
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With this introduction in mind, core technical terms encountered in SOA – XML 
(see next section), SOAP, WSDL and UDDI – are defined.51  
1. SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol)  
It is an XML based transport mechanism for exchanging information between 
applications within a distributed environment, where databases can be stored on one 
server (a partner organization, such as an MTS), and accessed by clients (say TSA) across 
the Internet.  For data to be transferred between computers, communication protocols 
must be established.  SOAP is a communications protocol used to send messages between 
applications, or allow one application to invoke and use a capability of another remote 
application.  SOAP is the most commonly used, application independent, transport 
protocol standard for moving messages between services.  A SOAP message is an XML 
document whose root element is called the envelope, which contains two child elements 
called the body and the header.  The body carries the application payload, while the 
header carries higher level protocols, such as security.  SOAP is typically used in 
conjunction with Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP).  HTTP supports easy traversal of 
firewalls and can be used with mobile and wireless environments as well.52   
2. WSDL (Web Services Description Language) 
It is an XML based language for describing web services, and for publishing their 
interfaces to the network.  WSDL is used by service providers to publish details of the 
services they offer.   It enables a client application or user to determine the location of the 
remote web service, the functions it implements, as well as how to access and use each 
function.  After parsing a WSDL description, a client can appropriately format a SOAP 
request.  The WSDL description goes hand in hand with the development of a new web 
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typically stored in registries (“Yellow Pages”) called UDDIs (described in the following 
subsection) that can be searched by potential users to locate web services with desired 
capabilities.53   
For a provider to publish information so that it is available to others on the web, 
the provider needs to develop a description of its service using a WSDL and publish it to 
a UDDI directory.  A client application (example, TSA) locates the service using the 
UDDI directory, then uses the WSDL description to establish how to communicate with 
it.  Requests and responses between the service and the client would be passed in SOAP 
wrapped XML documents.     
3. UDDI (Universal Description, Discovery and Integration) 
It is a specification for a registry of information for web services.  UDDI defines a 
means to publish, and more importantly discover (search), information about web 
services including WSDL files.  After browsing through an UDDI registry for 
information about available web services, the WSDL for the selected service can be 
parsed, and an appropriate SOAP message sent to the service.54 Integration (UDDI) 
complements WSDL and provides a standard way for defining web service registries so 
that services can be easily searched and selected.  
SOA is made possible by the widespread acceptance of open, published standards, 
perhaps the most important of which is eXtensible Markup Language (XML), which is 
used by almost all web services.55   
B. APPLICATION OF XML TO INFORMATION SHARING56 
1. What is XML? (eXtensible Markup Language)   
XML is a markup language rather than a programming language.  A markup 
language is used to label, categorize, and organize data or document content57.  XML is 
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eXtensible, meaning it is open ended, to permits users to write their own definitions to 
accommodate new types of data in the future. This is important in the evolving field of 
HS where an extensible markup language can easily accommodate future expansions and 
additions.  It enables the transportation security community to write new data definitions 
where existing definitions are not adequate for meeting their needs, as long as it is 
compliant with the XML rules established by the WorldWideWeb Consortium (W3C).  
The first XML specification was developed by consensus by the main standards 
organization of the web -W3C.58   
An XML formatted file contains not only data, but also describes the data 
contained in it (called “meta data”).  XML is designed to:  
• store data  
• describe that data  
• define how it should be processed and  
• allow for easy access and transmission of that data. 
While XML describes the data contained in a XML document, it does not address 
how the document is transferred from one system to another.  For data to be transferred 
between computers, communication protocols must be established.  Simple Object 
Access Protocol (SOAP), as described earlier, uses XML, and is the most commonly 
used, application independent, protocol standard.  Web Services Definition Language 
(WSDL), used by service providers to publish details of their services, also uses XML. 
2. Why use XML? 
Information sharing and data exchange between agencies and their computer 
systems has traditionally been difficult because each system has its own data format, 
requiring complex conversions for communication.  Fortunately, XML has quickly 
become a widely accepted standard for exchanging data over the World Wide Web 
between disparate computer systems and platforms.  XML is a key enabler for SOA.  
Because XML is simply a text file, the process of data exchange between different 
systems is greatly simplified.  Any program or system built to use XML (almost all are) 
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can read and process the data regardless of the operating system or platform it originated 
on, or is sent to.  That is why XML is described as being "platform independent" and is 
truly a ubiquitous (universal) standard for data exchange.   
Interviews and case reviews show that MTS data that is shared comes from a 
variety of sources and formats, such as databases, web pages, Word documents, Excel 
spreadsheets and emails.  If the key data found in these sources are transformed to XML 
files, then one can:  
• Gain access to a wider variety of data sources.  
• Do more with the available data.  
• Automate post processing and transformation of the data. 
• Readily share that data with others in a format usable to them, regardless 
of the platform or software used.     
XML applications can be used to advantage for information sharing, as described 
in the following examples: 
Since XML has a machine readable format, it allows the automated processing 
and use of data.  The automation feature should be used to advantage at fusion centers 
which may be inadequately staffed with analysts due to budget constraints.  A flood of 
information, often duplicative, can inundate analysts with too much data to sort through.  
Automation can reduce manual workload and alleviate the shortage of analysts, allowing 
them to focus on more productive tasks.  Using XML, a system can transform data from 
one form into another that is more usable for another system that needs it, and 
automatically send the data to that system.  For example, the same data can automatically 
feed a word document, a database or an excel spreadsheet for further analysis, depending 
on the need, without manual intervention.  XML makes the process of setting up 
automated systems vastly easier than using traditional data handling techniques and 
formats.   
Since both XML and databases store data in a structured and tagged format, XML 
is a good match for sharing information between disparate databases.  Data received from 
a XML file can be moved automatically into the appropriate fields in a database.  Data in 
 58
XML (text) format, along with information about its structure, can be imported into or 
exported directly from databases.  Application programs are readily available that read 
the XML data and converts it into whatever format a system requires, whether it’s a 
database or other information management system.  All major database systems such as 
Oracle, Microsoft Server and others, have XML utilities that work with XML in the 
context of databases.59     
XML helps to extract data selectively from a variety of sources and store the 
extracted data in one place with well-defined locations for the data (such as a searchable 
database).  It is then easy to find the needed data and extract it for use in further analysis 
(such as trends, intelligence), in conjunction with information from additional sources.   
A significant advantage is that an XML document allows its data to be displayed 
in different formats appropriate for users in different roles, such as a LE patrolman, an 
analyst or a firefighter.  It allows the same data to be displayed on a personal computer, 
wireless hand held devices, cell phones, as an email, text message or using a web 
browser.60  This provides unprecedented flexibility in sharing information.  For example, 
say an MTS employee fills out a SAR in Word format containing information to be 
shared with others.  Assuming that the protocols for sharing the SAR (with whom, what 
information) are already established, an alert notification can be sent out to a predefined 
distribution list.  The sender does not need to know what devices the recipient uses 
(blackberry, cell phone, pager, desktop computer, etc.) nor the operating system used.   
XML’s ability to provide access to a large pool of data, flexibility, automation 
characteristics and ease in transmitting data to a disparate set of systems, platforms and 
individuals makes it an excellent format for standardization.   
The use of XML by news agencies to reach a broad audience is illustrative.  The 
same data residing in a single file, with virtually no human interaction in the middle, can 
be transformed into a web page, or a ticker bar that runs across the bottom of a TV 
broadcast, used by a radio news agency as a story, inserted into a page layout program for 
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printing in a newspaper, delivered to a hand-held device like a cell phone as a text 
message or even translated into speech via a text-to-speech application.61   
3. How does XML work?  
It is important to understand how XML works, at least conceptually, to see how it 
can help information sharing among TSA and MTS.  A typical XML file consist of three 
main parts:  Data, Schemas, and Transforms, each of which is discussed. 
a. XML Data   
A XML data file, denoted by the .xml file extension, consists of the data 
and "tags" to describe what the data is and what it means.   The tags look similar to the 
tags used in HTML for formatting purposes for displaying web pages.  Unlike HTML 
however, XML allows the creation of any tag needed to describe new data.  This makes 
XML very flexible, which is why the X in XML stands for eXtensible.    
XML is both human and machine-readable.  Tags are the descriptors that 
enclose the data stored in the XML data file.  For example when a person’s name (the 
data) is stored in XML it is tagged as <name> John Doe </name>, so people and 
computers understand that it is a person’s name as they read through a document.  
Otherwise, the data inside the file could be nothing more than a jumble of information.  A 
tag is needed on either side of each piece of data, or surrounding a group of data.  
Because of this formatting, both people and computers can read the file and interpret the 
stored data without ambiguity. A XML document is a text file with a structured definition 
of the stored data.   Virtually any type of data can be described by XML (words, figures, 
equations, forecasts, pictures, GPS map data, etc.). 
b. XML Schema 
XML schemas, created according to the rules of the XML schema 
specification of the W3C,62 are the key technology that enables interoperability in web 
services.  To share data with other entities and to receive data in particular data formats it 
                                                 
61 Bergin and Kenji, XML Lab 01.  
62 For more information see  http://www.w3.org/XML/Schema#dev (accessed September 9, 2008). 
 60
is important to let the other collaborative entities know how to create and structure that 
data.  A schema is an excellent communication tool to achieve this.  The W3C schema 
specification defines the structure other XML documents should follow, i.e., what 
markups are used and how.  A schema acts like a template that specifies the form that 
XML documents must take.   
A schema file has the extension. XSD, and defines the rules or structure 
for what can and cannot reside in XML data files.   A schema63 is an XML based 
statement of rules that represents an XML document’s data model and defines its data 
elements (names or objects), their attributes (properties, such as datatype, which specifies 
whether the data consists of text or numbers), and the relationships between different 
elements.  Elements may be simple or complex, where complex elements contain other 
elements and attributes, while simple elements do not.   
In addition, a schema specifies the content of elements and attributes by 
using and defining specific data-types, i.e. whether the data should be text  (called 
“string”) such as a person’s name, or a number (“decimal”, “integer”)  and their 
constraints (minimum and maximum).64  A schema consists of declarations for elements 
and attributes, and specifies how they work together to define content and document 
structure.  For XML documents whose data will be moved to or from a database, the 
schema rules should be compatible with the rules in the database.   
A developer or programmer needs a schema file to design web pages, 
databases or software that creates and interprets XML Data files.  When a new type of 
data (not defined by an existing schema) needs to be stored in XML, either a new schema 
file needs to be created, or the existing one needs to be updated to reflect the addition.  
The version of the XML schema used is stated in a field called “namespace” to inform 
others which version of a schema was used to create a XML Data file.  Specifically, the 
namespace field specifies the URL which provides details of the XML version used. 
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As long as the schema conforms to XML schema standards, they can be 
transferred with the XML document, and other client applications can understand the 
data, because it is a published standard.  The information contained in a XML document 
is more than just the data itself.  It also describes the use and/or role for the data. This 
type of data description is also referred to as meta-data definition.     
An XML document developed by a HS agency can reference multiple 
external schemas, allowing an agency to include elements and attributes from schemas 
used by other agencies,65 including schemas published in the public domain.   This 
permits efficient sharing of vocabularies across documents and helps eliminate confusion 
when two or more vocabularies use the same elements, as is often seen in real-life 
applications.   
XML has made data exchange between systems easy.  It can be performed 
in several ways.66 
• both systems agree to send data in the same format.  Given the variety of 
existing systems this is probably not a realistic expectation. 
• The systems may agree to use a pre-existing schema that meets their 
mutual needs. 
• The systems need to convert the data from their native schema to the 
foreign schema each time data is sent or received.  This dynamic 
conversion is a likely option for many systems, including legacy systems, 
whose owners do not wish to incur the cost to modify their systems.  This 
dynamic conversion requires the use of XML Transforms. 
c. XML Transforms (XLST) 
Among the large number of disparate databases that need to share data it is 
unlikely that two or more systems exchanging data use exactly the same schema.  While 
it is possible for all participants to change their internal programming to reflect the same 
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schema, it is impractical to rebuild every system.  A practical solution is for each system 
to support data transformation, while continuing to use its native format for its internal 
processes.  When system A receives data from system B described in its (B’s) schema, A 
transforms it into data in its (A’s) schema.  Alternatively, B may transform its data before 
sending it to A.  Translations from one XML vocabulary to another, i.e. converting one 
set of markup to another is achieved by the XSLT transform, called stylesheets, also 
written in XML.  An XSLT stylesheet is a set of instructions to convert documents using 
one schema to another document using a different schema.  Each instruction focuses on 
one element of the source document and specifies how it should be changed to fit the 
second schema.  The stylesheet does not replace or change the elements in the source file, 
but instead builds a new file to hold the results of the transformation.     
Transforms are important for exchanging information between two 
systems both of which use XML but with a different vocabulary.  For example one 
system may use “suspicious person” compared to another using “person of interest”, to 
mean the same.  In XML based data exchange, systems often do not use the same XML 
vocabulary for their internal processes as the XML in which they receive or produce 
output.  The systems use XSLT to convert data from their internal XML vocabulary to 
the one they use for data exchange.  An XLST style sheet identifies an element in one 
document, and specifies how it should be described using a different element(s) in the 
new document.  A transform takes data defined by a specific tag in a XML data file, and 
defines how that data is re-mapped into a new tag specification for another file.    
To set up a transform, an Extensible Style Sheet Language Transform or 
XSLT file is created.  The XSLT contains the formatting rules for a XML transform.  
Because a large amount of XML data is used on the web, it is easy to find pre-defined 
transforms for free on the Internet, and XML transforms are also included with 
commercial software products today.  Stylesheets also provide instructions on how the 
data is to be displayed, whether on a PDA, cell phone, text message, e-mail, web browser 
etc.  Different display instructions are needed for different display options.  
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C. DHS FRAMEWORK AND STANDARDS FOR INFORMATION 
SHARING  
The inadequacies of information sharing are not limited to MTS, but are 
widespread throughout the HS community.  The Program Manager of the Information 
Sharing Environment (PM-ISE)67 describes the current state as lacking common 
guidance on information sharing, resulting in participants making independent decisions 
regarding terrorism information to be shared, with a limited ability to share information 
broadly.  It mentions a stove-piped environment with a patchwork of mission-specific 
information sharing flows producing conflicting, confusing, duplicative or unusable 
information. 
Consequently, DHS coordinated with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and state and local partners to develop a common 
national framework for information sharing.  Called the Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE) - Implementation Plan, dated November 2006,68 it outlines an 
overarching framework to link the resources of information sharing participants, which 
include people, systems, databases and information.  It envisions a future state of 
information sharing achieved through policy guidelines and technologies, to support a 
decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment that includes the following. 69 
• ensures direct and continuous online electronic access to information 
• facilitates the availability of information in a form and manner that 
facilitates its use in analysis, investigations, and operations; 
• builds upon existing systems capabilities in use across the government; 
• facilitates the sharing of information at and across all levels of security; 
                                                 
67 The Information Sharing Environment (ISE) was created as a result of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRPTA) to facilitate the sharing of terrorism and homeland security 
information among Federal, SLTT and the private sector. The Program Manager (PM) of the ISE is in the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). 
68 PM-ISE Information Sharing. 
69 Ibid., 134. 
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• incorporates strong mechanisms to enhance accountability, and facilitate 
authentication and access controls; and  
• incorporates protections of individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. 
The PM-ISE70 states that the federal government should develop and issue 
common standards for acquiring, accessing, sharing, and using terrorism related 
information.  Standards provide the critical functional and technical bridge between 
disparate information sources and users by facilitating interoperability for data exchange.  
Standards also play an important role in ensuring consistency of business processes, and 
are key factors when investing in the development of key IT architectures.  
A memorandum by the Secretary of DHS on Information Sharing Strategy, dated 
April 18, 2008, emphasizes the development of standards and other requirements for the 
ISE:71 
• Information sharing technology and protocols will be cross-functional 
with various domains, information technology systems, and infrastructures 
with the goal of creating a degree of interoperability with other systems. 
• DHS standards and protocols will utilize or leverage published 
commercial standards and protocols when available and appropriate. 
• The information needs and missions of all stakeholders, not technology, 
will drive the design of the information sharing environment.  Technology 
will be used to enhance and simplify information sharing. 
• DHS standards, procedures and applicable laws for privacy and civil 
liberties will guide and support the DHS information sharing environment.  
In its Annual Report to Congress (June 2008), the PM-ISE states that it works 
with agencies to enhance their information sharing capabilities using standards.72  The 
ISE has established a standardized reporting format for Suspicious Activities Reports 
                                                 
70 PM-ISE Information Sharing, 63-64. 
71 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Information Sharing Governance Board, Information 
Sharing Strategy, Washington: D.C. Department of Homeland Security, 2008. 
72 Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, Annual Report to the Congress on the 
Information Sharing Environment, Washington D.C.: Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2008. 
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(SARs) that can be leveraged by LE and other agencies.  LE agencies have long relied on 
tips and leads provided by the public to support anti-crime efforts.  In the post 9/11 
world, some of these tips could potentially provide critical information on suspicious 
activities relating to terrorist threats. 
Section 2.2 of the Annual Report provides an overview of the ISE Enterprise 
Architecture Framework, reproduced below.  According to the report: 
A major requirement of the ISE is to standardize and rationalize the 
inherent differences and distinct separation of information resources 
across the federal government, and between Federal and SLT 
agencies….The challenge is to provide a unifying construct – based on 
common standards and core services – that still accommodates the need 
for individual (“mostly common”) implementations….The PM-ISE 
established the ISE architecture program to align and integrate the vast 
collection of diverse information technology systems used by all ISE 
participants into a more uniform, interconnected ISE-wide system of 
systems….The ISE Architecture Program, employing cross governmental 
working groups such as the Chief Architects’ Roundtable, addresses this 
technology challenge .73   
TSA should be fully engaged in working with the ISE to leverage these efforts to 
share information for enhancing surface transportation security.  The diagram below, 
from the report, shows the concept for how two ISE participants would share in the ISE: 
                                                 
73Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, Annual Report to the Congress on the 
Information Sharing Environment, Washington D.C.: Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2008. 
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Figure 1.   Overview of the ISE Enterprise Architecture Framework 
 
1. Standards: National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) 
NIEM is a national standard to create a common vocabulary, and it offers a 
structured approach for developing records and reference documents.  The ISE has 
identified NIEM as an interagency framework for sharing information using XML, an 
open (published) standard that allows information exchange regardless of computer 
systems or platforms.74  The DoJ and DHS launched NIEM through a partnership 
agreement on Feb 28, 2005.75  NIEM leverages the data exchange standards, called the 
Global Justice Information Sharing Data Model (Global JXDM), used by the Justice 
community, and expands its applicability to include information sharing across public 
                                                 
74 A new standard called Universal Core (UCore), interoperable with NIEM, was released on April 17, 
2008.  UCore is a standard approach for a few elements of data common to many exchanges in the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and the Intelligence Community (IC), relating to the concepts of “where” 
and “when”.  April 17, 2008 memo cosigned by the CIOs of DoD and IC, titled “Department of Defense 
(DoD) and Intelligence Community (IC) Initial Release of Universal Core (UCore). 
75 NIEM Program Management Office, Introduction to the National Information Exchange Model 
(NIEM), vers. 0.3 (February 12, 2007),  NIEM Program Management Office, 
http://www.niem.gov/library.php (accessed 10 September 2008), 3. 
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safety, emergency and disaster management, intelligence and homeland security 
enterprises.  NIEM is designed to develop, disseminate, and support enterprise-wide 
information sharing standards and processes.  For example, NIEM can be applied to the 
screening of people and cargo, and international trade, as well as computer exchanges 
involving a variety of data including criminal records, arrest warrants, and suspicious 
persons or activities.76  NIEM identifies operational information exchanges among 
participating “domains” by examining current practices, and identifies new information 
exchange opportunities to achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness and operational 
capabilities.77  NIEM defines “domain” as an enterprise reflecting the agencies, units of 
government, which are affiliated to meet common objectives.  In addition to Justice, the 
other domains in NIEM are Intelligence, Immigration, Emergency Management, 
International Trade, and Infrastructure Protection.  Infrastructure Protection is largely 
represented by the Open GIS Consortium.78  Each domain contains layers of federal, 
State, local, tribal and private sector entities.  NIEM domains are illustrated below.79 
                                                 
76 NIEM Program Management Office, Introduction to the National Information Exchange Model 
(NIEM), vers. 0.3 (February 12, 2007),  NIEM Program Management Office, 
http://www.niem.gov/library.php (accessed 10 September 2008), 1-2. 
77 Ibid., 4. 
78For more information on the Geographical Information Systems (GIS) Consortium see 
http://www.opengeospatial.org/ (accessed September 7, 2008). 




Figure 2.   NIEM Domains 
 
NIEM  defines “Communities of Interest” (COI)s as collaborative groups who 
exchange information in pursuit of shared goals, and therefore must have a shared 
vocabulary for the information exchange.80  For example, Law Enforcement and 
Emergency Responders are communities of interest that exchange information with 
several domains, such as transportation.   
Similar to many nascent endeavors in HS, NIEM is an iterative process, and is 
undergoing development as newer communities of interest engage in NIEM.  NIEM is 
                                                 
80 NIEM, Introduction, 9. 
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yet to be leveraged by the surface transportation domain.  The time is right for the 
transportation sector to engage in the NIEM process.  As the number of stakeholders and 
participating domains increase, the value proposition for NIEM increases.  In turn, it will 
enhance the capability of the surface transportation domain to share information with the 
communities across which it should be shared.  
2. Data Exchange Standards 
The fundamental building block of NIEM is the data component representing 
real-world objects that are typically exchanged between agencies.  These include 
information about people, places, things and events.   NIEM offers standard agreement on 
terms contained in computer based messages.  It allows agreement on what different 
words mean and the structure and relationship of data.  NIEM facilitates SARs to contain 
elements that are well defined and related in a data model, that law enforcement can use 
without manually having to re-enter data.   
Data exchange standards also ensure that there is semantic consistency and 
common  understanding in the structure of the data that crosses agency lines.  Data 
components uniformly used in practice and specified in NIEM are published and made 
available for use by other communities.  This “reuse” of data components, saves partner 
agencies the cost and labor of “reinventing the wheel” by developing similar or identical 
components.  Reuse results in fewer exchanges, and reduces risk in development efforts 
through common exchange standards, tools, processes, and methodologies.   
When stakeholders share information regarding a person suspected with a 
connection to terrorism, there must be a common understanding of the terminology and 
attributes describing the person.  One agency may refer to the person as an arrestee, 
whereas another as defendant, but in either case both can be described in terms of basic 
common denominators, such as name, age, sex, race, ethnicity, height, weight, eye color, 
hair color, body type, birthmark, etc.  Characteristics such as these to identify a person 
are universally understood and used by all agencies irrespective of their mission.  It 
carries the same meaning across all COIs.  These are referred to as Universal Data 
Components.  Universal components can be stored in NIEM and reused by other 
 70
interested COIs without requiring further definition.  Each NIEM domain can extend 
(build on) universal data components by adding other components as shown in the figure 
below.  The figure below shows Universal (U: Person), Justice (J: Person) and 
Immigration (IM: Person), to conceptually demonstrate how the addition of attributes to 
basic (Universal) data components can result in new data components for use by other 
domains.  For instance, the addition of attributes such as biometrics and criminal history 
to the Universal definition of a Person (U: Person) makes the Universal definition 
suitable for use by the Justice community (J: Person).  These components can be accessed 
from the published NIEM registry, and reused by the transportation domain as needed.  In 
addition, the transportation domain may extend the Universal person data component by 
adding transportation related attributes, for example rail or bus operator, passenger, flight 
attendant etc.    
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Figure 3.   Concept of Component Reuse 81 
 
As the agency responsible for harmonizing the security needs across all modes of 
transportation, TSA should actively engage in the NIEM development process to identify 
existing NIEM data components that can be used for transportation, and identify new 
ones that need to be created by extending NIEM components or built from scratch.   A 
thorough analysis of the data needs of the transportation sector should be conducted to 
determine its data needs, to include components that can be drawn from domains external 
                                                 
81 NIEM, Introduction, 7. 
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to NIEM.  To achieve this, the author recommends that TSA establish Working Groups 
(WG) of MTS security operations personnel, data management experts, and appropriate 
stakeholders, after establishing an appropriate governance structure to interface with 
NIEM82   
According to an article in Federal Computer Week,83 the information commonly 
exchanged between participating NIEM domains are organized into Information 
Exchange Package Documentations (IEPDs) in the form of XML schemas.  The IEPDs 
include documents that most users and operational personnel share such as Suspicious 
Activities Reports (SARs), forms, and queries against databases.  The IEPDs address core 
business areas such as incident reporting, people screening, suspicious activities, cargo 
screening, emergency and disaster management, and case management.  The content is 
enclosed in a message which provides routing information and associated security 
controls needed to deliver the content.  NIEM provides a central location (registry) where 
these standard documentation packages (IEPDs) can be registered and stored for 
discovery and reuse by others.84  The IEPDs can be accessed and extended by any user to 
address their unique information needs   The IEPDs standardize the information, resulting 
in machine readable, easy to understand, software components.  SOA enables these 
software components to be discovered, shared and reused. 
Appropriate security information needs to be shared with the private sector.  
Many of the data definitions, and open standards are defined by industry and 
implemented in their tool sets and products.  The standards are market driven by large 
private sector companies, such as Microsoft and IBM.  Government standards such as 
NIEM should be developed to be consistent with private industry standards, so that data 
is efficiently exchanged between government and industry.  This can be accomplished by 
government participation in open standards development bodies. 
                                                 
82 Governance is discussed later in the thesis. 
83 FCW Staff, “The New Public Safety Language,” Federal Computer Week (August 27, 2007), 
http://www.fcw.com/print/13_30/features/103576-1.html (accessed September 19, 2008). 
84 Registries are sites where the reusable software can be located or the instructions for locating them 
can be found.  
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VII. SOA ARCHITECTURE FOR TSA  
A SOA should be designed and developed around the business practices and 
operational procedures of an agency or community.  The SOA architecture for TSA 
should be consistent with TSA and MTS’ business processes, and the organizational 
structure of TSA, for the SOA to make TSA more effective and efficient.  The 
architecture will help TSA harmonize its organizational stovepipes between Surface 
Transportation Security, Aviation Security Operations, and the FAMS.    
The RIJAN and RDTSF models for regional information sharing provide 
elements that TSA can develop further, consistent with its organizational structure 
including field components.   TSA is establishing Operations Control Centers (OCCs) 
under the control of TSA Federal Security Directors (FSDs) at airports around the 
country.  TSA’s Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs) are field 
representatives that provide security liaison with local MTS and rail systems, and report 
to FSDs, who are in charge of OCCs.    Since the STSIs and OCCs are both within the 
FSD’s area of responsibility, it makes sense to connect the OCCs (containing STSI 
representatives) to local MTS, state fusion centers, local LE and JTTF, to form a local/ 
regional network in each area, similar to RIJAN or RDTSF.  Informal regional networks 
already exist, and FSDs should leverage them and implement SOA to connect them with 
OCCs using the Internet and IT applications.  Since both major airports and the Top 50 
MTS are both located in large urban areas, MTS systems should be connected to TSA by 
leveraging TSA’s OCCs.  SOA is the best means to accomplish IT connectivity between 
an OCC and its regional partners.  
State and local fusion centers and LE agencies, and JTTFs would play important 
roles in the regional/ local network with OCCs.  MTS would play roles commensurate 
with their size, capability, geographic location, risk and related considerations.  The 
regional/ local SOA networks are depicted in the diagram below as “Notional” Regional 
Networks 1, 2, 3, etc., providing any-to-any connectivity within each region.  HS 
information would be gathered from regional partners, and automatically vetted at OCCs 
for the information needed to meet TSA’s needs.  Information from each OCC would be 
 74
available to the TSOC using a national level TSA SOA connecting various OCCs with 
TSOC and TSA Headquarters.  By connecting the regional databases across the nation 
using SOA, TSA Headquarters would be able to connect the dots across the nation, and 
develop a nationally consolidated security picture at the TSOC.   TSA would provide 
consolidated information for the transportation sector to the DHS NOC.  Sector specific 
agencies responsible for other sectors could emulate TSA’s SOA model, and similarly 
provide their consolidated information to the NOC, to provide DHS an overall awareness 
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Figure 4.   TSA- Architecture for Information Sharing  
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The implementation of new IT technology involves large financial investments; 
consequently publicly funded MTS systems, especially smaller ones, are unlikely to be 
able to invest in security improvements from their budgets.  Since TSA is responsible for 
security of the transportation sector, TSA’s implementation strategy should be to bear 
most of the cost of the technical investment for implementing SOA, rather than require 
MTS agencies to do so.   
MTS rely on TSA’s Transit Security Grants Program85 (TSGP) for funding to 
implement security improvements.  The TSGP is an important avenue that can be used to 
assist MTS towards meeting their IT expenses for SOA, by amending TSA’s current 
grant guidelines and policy.  Through TSA’s interaction with MTS, using the 
Transportation Sector Coordinating Council (SCC), TSA and MTS representatives can 
determine the “sweet spot” to balance cost sharing between TSA and MTS.  TSA should 
permit MTS to use grants funding for the small IT investments necessary to interface 
MTS and regional databases with the overarching SOA to be established by TSA.  
To minimize demands on its own resources, TSA’s strategy should be to 
standardize a SOA model for use in regional networks.  A prototype standard model 
should first be developed and tested for an OCC in a selected region. Once standardized, 
the model should be implemented at OCCs/ regions around the U.S.   Standardization 
allows a cost effective approach for TSA to implement SOA at OCCs nationwide, 
compared to developing unique IT configurations for each region.  SOA allows the 
flexibility to allow a standard approach to be used even though regional needs vary.    
To standardize the regional OCC model, TSA Headquarters should establish IT 
teams to select an OCC, and gather requirements to develop a standardized model for 
prototype testing and implementation.  Based on the requirements established earlier, 
regional networks around OCCs should implement a system that automatically pulls 
information from stakeholders rather than rely on them to push information.  This  
 
 
                                                 
85 Transit Security Grant Program Tier I 2008, 
http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/grants/programs/tsgp_tieri/2008/index.shtm (accessed September 7, 
2008).  
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alleviates MTS from the burden of sending information using manual means, when busy 
responding to an incident.  TSA should make the necessary financial investment for the 
technology. 
It is both practical and advantageous to have a distributed strategy for data 
ownership by MTS and other partners.  Such a strategy is a natural outcome of the way 
information sharing has developed through local and regional partnerships.  Owners of 
the data, such as MTS may prefer to maintain control of their data and its dissemination, 
and make decisions about what services to offer and what data to make accessible to 
other partners.  According to Harbitter, participants prefer a decentralized system because 
they prefer not to relinquish control of their data.  Decentralization is also advantageous 
because it helps keep the data current, and maintain the quality of information.  Because 
the participants use the data for their own operational purposes, they are motivated by 
their corporate policies and requirements to keep their individual databases updated and 
ensure the quality of their information.  Had TSA simply collected data into its 
warehouse, rather than tapping into stakeholders’ databases, it would be very difficult for 
TSA to ensure data currency and quality consistently on a nationwide basis.  
A significant advantage of using SOA for MTS, state and local participants is that 
they do not need to change their stored data to XML format to enable data exchange.  
They can retain their legacy data storage formats and systems.   As noted earlier, 
participants store data in a variety of formats other than XML, on systems that are not 
interoperable.  For example, some may store data on flat files,86 or in Excel or Access or 
other databases.   To address this at minimal cost to MTS and stakeholders, TSA should 
provide stakeholders with a transformation server application – a software application 
the participants can download from TSA onto their servers via the Internet.87  The 
application can be used to transform legacy formats into a XML compatible format.  For 
example for a  CSV file, the transformation application goes through each line of code 
and inserts an XML tag to identify each data item.  Since the MTS staff know what their 
                                                 
86 Flat file are different from databases.  Flat files contain data elements separated by commas – called 
comma separated files (CSV). 
87 Sandeep Chatterjee, personal communication with author, July 2008. 
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internal data means and how it is defined, MTS staff will need to assist TSA IT staff in 
this endeavor.  As another example, if the data is already in XML format in the MTS 
agency’s database, and its data schema calls a data item “operator” whereas the TSA 
schema refers to the same as “train operator”, then a XML Style Sheet should be included 
in the transform to make the change for establishing equivalency.  
Using the analogy of client-server architecture, TSA is the client, while MTS and 
other stakeholders possessing data are servers.  The data can be dynamically transformed 
from the format in which it is stored at the MTS server to the XML file TSA needs, on 
demand i.e. when the client requests the data.  This is made possible by the “XLST” 
transform that resides within the transformation server application TSA can provide to 
MTS and other stakeholders.  Since the XLST engine makes the change of format 
automatically, stakeholders do not need to invest manual effort, once the XLST is 
implemented.     
TSA’s IT strategy should be to determine what data it needs to ask for from the 
information sharing participants i.e. TSA should establish requirements for the data it 
seeks from MTS.  This is a joint decision between TSA’s IT staff, those responsible for 
managing MTS security operations at TSA, and MTS stakeholders.  TSA should develop 
a menu of the information it needs, develop the appropriate IT transformation application, 
and provide it to MTS and other stakeholders who provide data to TSA, as a web service.  
TSA, as the client, would then invoke the service on its partners’ servers, each time TSA 
needed to pull data from participants’ servers.  By pulling information in an automated 
fashion, it considerably reduces the labor and IT cost burden on stakeholders. 
The core web services do not provide the necessary capabilities for secure 
communications, authentication and role based access to information by various users.  
Additional technologies need to be layered on top of the core SOA platform to provide 
support for security and authentication.  These aspects are not addressed in this thesis, for 
paucity of the author’s time. 
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VIII. COLLABORATION, INCLUSION & GOVERNANCE  
While SOA offers a good solution to information sharing, the implementation of 
change, including that involving technology, presents a host of other challenges that need 
to be addressed by TSA.  Technology alone cannot resolve other issues that affect 
information sharing, such as establishing collaboration, trust and governance among 
stakeholders.   
A key challenge for TSA is to communicate, educate and demonstrate the value of 
SOA to a broad range of participants, both at local/regional and headquarters levels, to 
assure participant buy-in.  It will be challenging to demonstrate the benefits of SOA 
before implementing it, and the technological nature of SOA makes it particularly 
difficult to communicate to a broader audience beyond technologists.  Some of these 
challenges and recommendations are discussed below. 
A. COLLABORATION & INCLUSION   
Inclusion of a broad range of relevant regional partners early in the planning and 
decision making process is vital for achieving success in a collaborative venture such as 
information sharing.88  Acceptance and participation is important to increase the reach 
and number of stakeholders, to capture relevant information as quickly and completely as 
possible.   
Much of the information, which TSA needs for protecting MTS against terrorism, 
can only be obtained from grassroots level observations by MTS, LE agencies, and fusion 
centers around the country.  Consequently, these communities are key stakeholders who 
need to be included early in the collaborative process, with equitable representation from 
the MTS sector.   Since SOA is an IT initiative consistent with national data exchange 
standards such as NIEM, it is important that representatives from state CIOs and fusion 
centers be included for their IT and data management expertise.  It is also necessary to 
                                                 
88 National Task Force on Interoperability, Interoperability Articles: Principles for Moving toward 
Interoperability, Why Can’t we Talk? Supplemental Resources (February 12, 2003) 
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/library/interoperabilitybasics/1158_nationaltask.htm, 
(accessed September 7, 2008). 
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include state Department of Transportation (DOTs) and Emergency Operations Centers 
(EOCs) for obtaining situational awareness and information needed for response and 
recovery.  Appropriate private sector participants and their associations need to be 
included as well.  Networking, using SOA, increases the reach and number of 
stakeholders who can benefit from information sharing, adds expertise and value to the 
information by including a broad base of participants, and spreads technology costs 
across a wider base.   
In contrast, lack of inclusiveness led to the limited effectiveness of the Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN), according to a DHS Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) report.89  The OIG found that existing and effective collaboration systems were 
not utilized or networked into HSIN during its planning and development phase.  Instead, 
HSIN duplicated some existing systems that were already in use by stakeholders, while 
users continued to use existing systems they were familiar with, partially defeating the 
purpose of developing HSIN.   
The benefits of collaboration are difficult to demonstrate up front, and are 
dependant on what the participants bring to the table.  Benefits are realized in increments, 
as processes are gradually improved to progressively add value.  Small networks then 
become larger, which enriches the value of the information, attracting more participants 
to join and create even more value.   
The worldwide web and its use of open standards have revolutionized information 
sharing capabilities and collaboration by allowing “any” to “any” information sharing.90  
Wikipedia, eBay, Google and Napster are some well-known examples.  Information is 
quickly accessed and used by participants in decentralized networks, enabling timely 
response, compared to networks based on centralized bureaucracies.91     
                                                 
89 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Homeland Security Information 
Network Could Support Information Sharing More Effectively (Washington, D.C., Government Printing 
Office, 2006), 3, 11. 
90 Ori Brafman and Rod A.Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider (London: Penguin Group, 2006). 
91 Ibid. 
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TSA’s FSDs at airports and their STSI’s have the important responsibility to 
foster collaboration and develop regional governance, as part of their role of liaison and 
building relationships with transportation operators.  Additionally they should expand 
their engagement to other regional participants such as fusion centers, LE agencies, 
JTTFs and State DOTs.  The key players in each region should be identified and included 
by FSDs, while some stakeholders may be unique to each area.   The FSDs should 
establish a governing structure for their region, balance equities among those invited to 
participate, and collaboratively establish responsibilities and resources for key 
stakeholders.   
FSDs should hold regional meetings with participants, establish IT working 
groups, and communicate the benefits of information sharing using SOA.  FSDs’ regional 
efforts should be complemented by outreach to MTS nationwide from TSA Headquarters 
using existing forums such as the Transportation Sector Coordinating Council (TSCC).  
The TSCC was established under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) for 
dialog between government and industry on security issues, to include information 
sharing.  TSA should also use its relationship with its Peer Advisory Group, a group of 
transit police chiefs from representative MTS established to advise TSA on initiatives to 
improve security.  Since the implementation of SOA is a voluntary (rather than 
regulatory) initiative, it is important that TSA educate and effectively communicate its 
message to encourage and achieve sufficient participation.   
Given the complexity, the large number of participants involved, and the 
evolution in HS information needs at all levels, an incremental implementation approach 
would be most practical and cost effective.  This would enable a continuous assessment 
of the prototype, and gradual acceptance and understanding of its value by participants.  
Since a small group of participants are more likely to develop trust, and agree on 
governance rules for information sharing, establishing a small regional collaborative 
agreement is a realistic first step.  Success achieved in a region can then become a 
regional prototype model that other regions can emulate.  SOA is ideal for an incremental 
approach to building IT information sharing.     
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The author recommends that TSA should develop, test, and implement a regional 
prototype SOA, for obtaining user feedback and learn lessons, and then implement the 
model at regional networks elsewhere. 
B. GOVERNANCE  
It is important that TSA establish governance structures that are inclusive along 
both horizontal (OCC with regional stakeholders) and vertical (OCC/ region with TSA 
headquarters) directions.  Because informational needs, contributions and responsibilities 
vary among stakeholders within regional networks, stakeholder responsibilities should be 
documented with memoranda of understanding (MOU).  Each region should have a 
governing body with balanced representation among its participants, and MOUs should 
define what the governing body will provide, and what each stakeholder should provide 
towards the overall collaborative effort.  Since SOA allows each owner of the data to 
allow selective access to their data, MOUs should state who will share what data.  Each 
regional governing body should be chaired by the regional FSD, since TSA is the prime 
mover for establishing the information sharing architecture.  Functions for the governing 
body should include the following: 
• system planning 
• identifying need for grants for IT 
• provisions for IT support, subject matter expertise and guidance 
• provisions for training in understanding SOA and NIEM 
• approval of system users 
• establishing ad hoc working groups 
• TSA Headquarters to provide IT contract support to regional TSA OCCs 
A headquarters-level, over-arching governing body should coordinate the 
activities of the regional governing bodies. 
C. TSA ORGANIZATION  
To provide effective leadership to the MTS community, TSA’s internal 
organizational structure should also support information sharing.   However, an OIG 
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report92 states that lines of communication between the STSI’s in the field, and TSA 
headquarters are not clear, leading to poor communications with MTS stakeholders.  It 
mentions organizational stovepipes within TSA headquarters between its Mass Transit 
Division within the Office of Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM), the 
Office of Security Operations (OSO), and the Office of Law Enforcement (OLE/FAMS), 
which impact the effectiveness of information sharing within TSA.  There exist 
overlapping roles and unclear responsibilities among TSA offices tasked with rail 
security-related missions.  TSA’s rail security organization is depicted below: 
 
 
Figure 5.   TSA Headquarters Organization for MTS Security 
 
A similar picture of stovepiped information sharing emerged from the analysis of 
interviews of TSA personnel mentioned earlier.  LE information relating to suspicious 
incidents is restricted to aviation, and falls within the domain of the FAMS in OLE.  
Surface transportation information collected by TSOC from external partners contain 
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transportation situational awareness information relating to accidents, hazmat spills and 
traffic closures, with limited LE content.  There is no direct connectivity between TSA 
OLE/ FAMS, TSNM and TSOC’s surface transportation information sharing.   
Furthermore, TSA headquarters components – OLE/ FAMS, OSO and TSNM use IT 
systems that do not communicate with each other.   
The author recommends that while TSA addresses issues in the OIG’s report, it 
should, as a minimum: 
• Ensure that databases within the TSA enterprise are connected, using a 
limited scale SOA, to give participants within TSA access to necessary 
information within each others’ databases.   
• Enable IT systems to exchange information between TSOC and TSA 
headquarters by enabling IT systems to access relevant information in 
their respective databases. 
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